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Search Results (11744 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-85816 | 1 Microsoft | 23 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 20 more | 2026-10-20 | 5.7 Medium |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Wi-Fi Driver allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over an adjacent network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98158 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-20 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ppp_async: drop the errored frame instead of resetting its headroom ppp_receive_nonmp_frame() prepends a two-byte direction tag before running the pass/active BPF filters: *(__be16 *)skb_push(skb, 2) = htons(PPP_FILTER_INBOUND_TAG); Nothing on the receive path guarantees those two bytes of headroom. The frame-error path in ppp_async's process_input_packet() resets a reused skb's headroom to zero while claiming to restore it to a freshly allocated state - but a fresh skb from dev_alloc_skb() carries NET_SKB_PAD: err: if (skb) { /* make skb appear as freshly allocated */ skb_trim(skb, 0); skb_reserve(skb, - skb_headroom(skb)); } ap->rpkt still points at that skb, so the next frame is reassembled into it with no headroom at all. A peer that sends a bad-FCS frame followed by one beginning ff 03 then leaves a single byte of headroom by the time the filter tag is pushed, which lands one byte below skb->head: skbuff: skb_under_panic: len:49 put:2 head:ffff888003c10000 data:ffff888003c0ffff tail:0x30 end:0x640 dev:<NULL> kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214! RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x13e/0x230 Call Trace: skb_push+0xbd/0x100 ppp_receive_nonmp_frame+0x48a/0x1d10 ppp_input+0x4e9/0x2f80 ppp_async_process+0x2a/0xe0 tasklet_action_common+0x20f/0x8a0 handle_softirqs+0x18e/0x590 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Zeroing the headroom violates the NET_SKB_PAD guarantee that dev_alloc_skb() gives the rest of the receive path. Besides the filter panic above, when CCP compression is enabled ppp_decompress_frame() hands skb->data - 2 to ->decompress()/->incomp(), which then reads out of bounds before skb->head for the same reason. Rather than restore the headroom, drop the errored frame - as ppp_synctty already does on its error path - and clear ap->rpkt so the next frame is reassembled into a fresh skb with proper headroom. This is simpler and fixes both the filter under-panic and the CCP out-of-bounds read. The original V1 of this patch made room in ppp_receive_nonmp_frame() with skb_cow_head(); Eric pointed out that fixing the root cause in the transport is the right approach. Found by fuzzing the PPP receive path with a mutating peer on a pty; it is an interesting (remote) DoS: root configures PPP, the peer supplies two crashing frames. The reproducer (repro-ppp-skb.c, unchanged from v1) panics in about a second, and returns cleanly with this applied. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98155 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-20 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/qaic: Address potential out-of-bounds read in resp_worker() Although 'commit 2feec5ae5df7 ("accel/qaic: Handle DBC deactivation if the owner went away")' fixes the scenario it was intended for by walking the message and only decoding QAIC_TRANS_DEACTIVATE_FROM_DEV, if present, it skipped over the bounds checking code that is included in decode_message(). This could lead to issues such as reading past the slab allocation's end, infinite loops or kernel panics. For those issues to happen, a malformed wire message is needed to be sent from the device. Instead of duplicating the bounds checking code already present in decode_message(), use the function inside resp_worker(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-43849 | 1 Advantech | 1 Adam-3600 | 2026-10-20 | N/A |
| A heap memory read vulnerability could allow an attacker to exfiltrate sensitive data. | ||||
| CVE-2026-101201 | 1 Qt | 3 Qt, Qt5compat, Qtbase | 2026-10-20 | 5.5 Medium |
| A malformed header in the binary file fed to QBinaryJson::fromBinaryData() can cause undefined behaviour because of out-of-bounds read. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97779 | 1 Microsoft | 14 365 Apps, Microsoft 365, Microsoft 365 Apps For Enterprise and 11 more | 2026-10-20 | 6.5 Medium |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97821 | 1 Microsoft | 28 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 25 more | 2026-10-20 | 6.5 Medium |
| Out-of-bounds read in DNS Server allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98495 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-20 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: arp: terminate device name before lookup The ARP ioctl copies a user-provided struct arpreq into a stack object. Its arp_dev field may contain IFNAMSIZ bytes without a NUL terminator. Such input is passed to dev_get_by_name_rcu() or __dev_get_by_name(), where strcmp() can read past the end of the stack object when a matching alternative interface name exists. Terminate the field before the lookup to prevent the out-of-bounds read. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97819 | 1 Microsoft | 28 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 25 more | 2026-10-20 | 6.5 Medium |
| Out-of-bounds read in DNS Server allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98531 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-20 | 3.3 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: sr: enforce exact attribute length for SEG6_ATTR_DST In seg6_genl_policy, SEG6_ATTR_DST is defined with .type = NLA_BINARY and .len = sizeof(struct in6_addr). For NLA_BINARY, .len only enforces the maximum payload length and permits shorter payloads (e.g., 0 bytes). When seg6_genl_set_tunsrc() copies sizeof(struct in6_addr) bytes via kmemdup(val, sizeof(*val), GFP_KERNEL), a short SEG6_ATTR_DST attribute triggers a 16-byte out-of-bounds read past skb->tail into uninitialized skb->head memory, which is stored in sdata->tun_src and leaked back to userspace via SEG6_CMD_GET_TUNSRC. Switch SEG6_ATTR_DST in seg6_genl_policy to NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN(sizeof(struct in6_addr)) so that generic netlink validation rejects any attribute whose length is not exactly sizeof(struct in6_addr) with -ERANGE. Tested in QEMU against Linux 7.3.0-rc3 by sending a SEG6_CMD_SET_TUNSRC Generic Netlink message with a 0-byte SEG6_ATTR_DST attribute followed by SEG6_CMD_GET_TUNSRC. On the unfixed kernel, SEG6_CMD_SET_TUNSRC succeeds (err = 0) and SEG6_CMD_GET_TUNSRC leaks 16 bytes of uninitialized kernel heap memory (tun_src = 836a61ecc4d25a1042a8d60411cfb378); with this patch applied, SEG6_CMD_SET_TUNSRC is rejected by netlink policy validation with -ERANGE (-34) and tun_src remains zeroed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97822 | 1 Microsoft | 28 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 25 more | 2026-10-20 | 6.5 Medium |
| Out-of-bounds read in DNS Server allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97840 | 1 Microsoft | 28 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 25 more | 2026-10-20 | 6.5 Medium |
| Out-of-bounds read in DNS Server allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97842 | 1 Microsoft | 28 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 25 more | 2026-10-20 | 6.5 Medium |
| Out-of-bounds read in DNS Server allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64380 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-20 | 8.2 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: harden POSIX SID length parsing posix_info_sid_size() reads sid[1] to obtain the subauthority count, but its existing boundary check still accepts buffers with only one remaining byte. Require two bytes before reading sid[1] so all client paths that reuse the helper reject truncated POSIX SIDs safely. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98583 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-20 | 4.4 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: nfcmrvl: validate helper command length before pull The firmware download receive path removes the NCI data header and reads the helper command before validating the remaining packet length. A short frame can therefore reach the data access before the malformed packet is rejected. Validate the complete helper command length before stripping the NCI data header. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97837 | 1 Microsoft | 28 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 25 more | 2026-10-20 | 6.5 Medium |
| Out-of-bounds read in DNS Server allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68082 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-20 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers() decode_lockers() in cls_lock_client.c contains two bare decode operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger slab-out-of-bounds reads: 1. ceph_decode_32(p) at the num_lockers field has no preceding bounds check. ceph_start_decoding() accepts struct_len=0 as valid -- the internal ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes -- so when an OSD sends struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end. The immediately following bare ceph_decode_32(p) then reads 4 bytes past the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is passed directly to kzalloc_objs() as the locker count. The sibling function decode_watchers() in osd_client.c already uses ceph_decode_32_safe() after its own ceph_start_decoding() call. decode_lockers() was the only site using the bare variant. 2. ceph_decode_8(p) after the decode_locker() loop has no preceding bounds check. If an OSD crafts num_lockers such that the loop advances p exactly to end, the subsequent bare ceph_decode_8(p) reads one byte past the validated buffer boundary. The result is passed directly into *type, which is used as a lock type discriminator by callers, giving an OSD-controlled one-byte OOB read with direct influence over the lock type field. Fix both by replacing bare operations with their safe variants: ceph_decode_32(p) -> ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, *num_lockers, err_inval) ceph_decode_8(p) -> ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, *type, err_free_lockers) The goto targets differ intentionally: err_inval: is a new label returning -EINVAL directly. It is used for the pre-allocation failure path where *lockers is not yet allocated and must not be passed to ceph_free_lockers(). err_free_lockers: is the existing label. It is used for the post-allocation failure path where *lockers is allocated and must be freed. ret is set to -EINVAL before ceph_decode_8_safe() so that err_free_lockers returns the correct error code on bounds violation. Without this, err_free_lockers would return a stale ret value (0 from the successful decode_locker() loop), silently swallowing the error. -EINVAL is correct for both failure paths. The data received from the OSD is structurally malformed. -ENOMEM would misrepresent the failure class to callers and to stable@ backporters triaging error paths. Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition). [ idryomov: trim changelog, formatting ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-98582 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-20 | 6.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: st21nfca: validate received frame size st21nfca_hci_i2c_repack() trims a received frame at its EOF marker before removing byte stuffing. It then assumes the truncated frame contains the LLC header and two CRC bytes, and it unconditionally reads the byte after an escape marker. A malformed frame can place EOF immediately after the start marker or can end its data portion with an escape marker. The former leaves too few bytes for check_crc(), while the latter makes the unstuffing loop read past the current skb length. Require the minimum framing bytes both before and after unstuffing. Use separate input and output cursors while removing byte stuffing, and reject an escape marker without its encoded byte. This keeps malformed frames within the received frame boundary before CRC processing. | ||||
| CVE-2026-110606 | 1 Librecad | 2 Libdxfrw, Librecad | 2026-10-20 | 3.3 Low |
| LibreCAD libdxfrw through LC2.2.0 (LibreCAD through 2.2.1.5) contains a stack-based out-of-bounds read vulnerability in dwgReader18::readFileHeader() caused by calling strlen on non-NUL-terminated buffers. Attackers can supply a crafted AC1018, AC1024 or AC1027 DWG file without NUL bytes in the decrypted header to read adjacent stack memory and crash the process. | ||||
| CVE-2026-52917 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-20 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: diag: reject stale associations in dump_one path The SCTP exact sock_diag lookup can hold a transport reference, block on lock_sock(sk), and then resume after sctp_association_free() has marked the association dead and freed its bind address list. When that happens, inet_assoc_attr_size() and inet_diag_msg_sctpasoc_fill() can still dereference association state that is no longer valid for reporting. In particular, inet_diag_msg_sctpasoc_fill() may read an empty bind-address list as a real sctp_sockaddr_entry and trigger an out-of-bounds read from unrelated association memory. Reject the association after taking the socket lock if it has been reaped or detached from the endpoint, and report the lookup as stale. This keeps the exact dump-one path from formatting torn association state. | ||||