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Search Results (622 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-56641 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: initialize close_work early to avoid warning We encountered a warning that close_work was canceled before initialization. WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 111103 at kernel/workqueue.c:3047 __flush_work+0x19e/0x1b0 Workqueue: events smc_lgr_terminate_work [smc] RIP: 0010:__flush_work+0x19e/0x1b0 Call Trace: ? __wake_up_common+0x7a/0x190 ? work_busy+0x80/0x80 __cancel_work_timer+0xe3/0x160 smc_close_cancel_work+0x1a/0x70 [smc] smc_close_active_abort+0x207/0x360 [smc] __smc_lgr_terminate.part.38+0xc8/0x180 [smc] process_one_work+0x19e/0x340 worker_thread+0x30/0x370 ? process_one_work+0x340/0x340 kthread+0x117/0x130 ? __kthread_cancel_work+0x50/0x50 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 This is because when smc_close_cancel_work is triggered, e.g. the RDMA driver is rmmod and the LGR is terminated, the conn->close_work is flushed before initialization, resulting in WARN_ON(!work->func). __smc_lgr_terminate | smc_connect_{rdma|ism} ------------------------------------------------------------- | smc_conn_create | \- smc_lgr_register_conn for conn in lgr->conns_all | \- smc_conn_kill | \- smc_close_active_abort | \- smc_close_cancel_work | \- cancel_work_sync | \- __flush_work | (close_work) | | smc_close_init | \- INIT_WORK(&close_work) So fix this by initializing close_work before establishing the connection. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99213 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vsock: treat TCP_CLOSING as once-established Handle the TCP_ESTABLISHED -> TCP_CLOSING transition on OP_RST, which can race with the connect loop. Immediately break and return 0 on ESTABLISHED/CLOSING. The return value of connect() should reflect what happened up to the point the connection was established or failed. Events that occur afterwards must not affect it. E.g. even if OP_RW has already set sk_err, connect() should still return 0, not ENOBUFS because of it. Adapt the inaccurate comment above signal_pending(). Resetting a socket that is still present in connected_table can lead to memory corruption. The reporter noted lost transports for in-flight skbs, and I have reproduced crashes caused by re-insertion into connected_table. list_add double add: new=, prev=, next=. kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:35! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI Workqueue: vsock-loopback vsock_loopback_work RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x11f/0x130 Call Trace: vsock_insert_connected.cold+0xe/0x13 virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x10e9/0x1460 vsock_loopback_work+0x305/0x480 process_one_work+0xe4c/0x1560 worker_thread+0x4f1/0xd60 kthread+0x36e/0x470 ret_from_fork+0x47b/0x6b0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 This fix is supplementary to commit 002541ef650b ("vsock: Ignore signal/timeout on connect() if already established"). Details under Link. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99133 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/iucv: fix the recvmsg window update iucv_sock_recvmsg() sends the HiperSockets-only AF_IUCV_FLAG_WIN without testing the transport, so on a classic z/VM socket iucv_send_ctrl() sizes the skb through a NULL iucv->hs_dev. SO_MSGLIMIT accepts 1, so msglimit / 2 is zero and one recvmsg() on its own socket is enough for an unprivileged process to take a spurious disconnect. It also calls iucv_send_ctrl() under spin_lock_bh(&message_q.lock), which allocates GFP_KERNEL inside a section the code treats as atomic. Sending outside that lock lets two recvmsg() reach afiucv_hs_send() at once, where msg_recv is sampled for the advertised window and subtracted after dev_queue_xmit() -- and sendmsg reaches that counter under lock_sock() while recvmsg holds no socket lock, so both can subtract the same value, the counter goes negative and the credit reaches the peer twice. Test the transport, claim the credit with atomic_xchg() after the last error exit and hand it back if the transmit fails, and send once the lock is dropped. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99114 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 4.3 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: initialize FileSystemControlFlags in FS_CONTROL_INFORMATION smb2_get_info_filesystem() reports 48 bytes for FS_CONTROL_INFORMATION, that is the whole of struct smb2_fs_control_info, but never assigns FileSystemControlFlags. Those four bytes go to the client as they are found in the response buffer. The buffer is zeroed on allocation, so a standalone request leaks nothing. A compound request can leak: the offset of the next response is advanced by the length pinned for the previous one, so a reply that was written into the buffer and then dropped in favour of the short error response of smb2_set_err_rsp() stays there, and the next reply is laid over it with only the header cleared. ksmbd does not implement quota tracking, so report no control flags. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99024 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: optee: register TEE devices only once fully initialized optee_probe() called tee_device_register() on both the client and the supplicant device before the rest of struct optee had been initialized. tee_device_register() calls cdev_device_add(), which does two things at once: it creates /dev/tee0 and /dev/teepriv0, and it links the device into the tee class so that class_find_device() can find it. From that moment on the device is reachable both from user space via tee_open() and from kernel space via tee_client_open_context(). The only gate in teedev_open() is tee_device_get(), which merely checks that teedev->desc is non-NULL, which was already set by tee_device_alloc(). Therefore, there is effectively no gate at all. A context opened in that window can run against a struct optee where - optee->call_queue.mutex is not initialized by optee_cq_init() - optee->supp mutex and completions is not initialized by optee_supp_init() - optee->rpmb_dev_mutex is not initialized yet, - the message argument cache is not initialized by optee_shm_arg_cache_init() - optee->ctx is still NULL Any open session or invoke during this window takes uninitialized mutexes and dereferences a NULL pointer. Fix it by moving both tee_device_register() calls down to the point where all of struct optee is set up. [JW: adding fixes and cc] | ||||
| CVE-2026-98993 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: don't inherit MNT_UMOUNT in clone_mnt() MNT_UMOUNT gets raised on a mount that umount_tree() or umount_one() has taken out of its namespace. It's never cleared. __detach_mounts() unhooks a mount that carries it instead of unmounting it. disconnect_mount() lets an unmounted child stay attached only if its parent carries it. propagate_umount() takes it as the sign that a mount is going to be unmounted when it decides what else can be unmounted, where a chain of locked mounts ends and where a for reparenting an overmount. clone_mnt() copies the flags of the source and only masks MNT_INTERNAL_FLAGS which doesn't include MNT_UMOUNT. A mount that was lazily unmounted but is kept alive by a file descriptor can still be copied when its root is an nsfs or pidfs file because may_copy_tree() accepts those before checking whether the source is mounted at all: mount --bind /proc/self/ns/net /tmp/x exec 3< /tmp/x umount -l /tmp/x mount --bind /proc/self/fd/3 /tmp/y The mount on /tmp/y is attached to the caller's namespace with MNT_UMOUNT already set and every copy of it inherits the flag again. That causes a number of bugs: - Unlink its mountpoint from a mount namespace where it isn't one. __detach_mounts() takes it for a mount that was unmounted earlier, unhooks it from its parent and drops the reference the namespace holds on it. It stays in the namespace with one reference too few and as its own parent, so it can't be unmounted through the file descriptor anymore and the namespace never finds it again. When the namespace goes away it's leaked and points to a freed struct mnt_namespace that may_change_propagation() and anon_ns_root() read on the next propagation change or mount_setattr() through the file descriptor. - Make it shared and unmount a peer. trace_transfers() follows the flag from the peer into it and strips it from its peer group. - Let a propagated umount reach it. gather_candidates() marks it with T_UMOUNT_CANDIDATE but never puts it on the candidate list, so the mark is never cleared and every later propagated umount skips it. If it's the parent of a locked mount handle_locked() takes it as the cutoff and commits the locked child that should have stayed and disconnect_mount() leaves that child attached to it, unmounted under a mounted parent, which is what disconnect_mount() exists to prevent. When the namespace goes away umount_tree() visits the child a second time. And once __detach_mounts() has made it its own parent reparent() never finds the end of the chain of unmounted parents. A clone is a new mount that has never been unmounted. Add MNT_UMOUNT to MNT_INTERNAL_FLAGS so clone_mnt() never copies it. And warn when umount_tree() reaches a mount that already has it set. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98698 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 5.3 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: handle empty FILS association request payload fils_encrypt_assoc_req() accepts a (Re)Association Request frame whose last element is the FILS Session element. crypt_len is then zero and aes_siv_encrypt() is called with an empty plaintext. kmemdup() returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR for a zero-length allocation, so the unconditional sg_init_one() puts an invalid page into the scatterlist. With CONFIG_DEBUG_SG this triggers a kernel BUG in sg_set_buf(); without the debug check the bogus page is handed to the crypto backend. AES-SIV is defined for empty plaintext and the S2V result is then the complete output, so handle this case before the CTR step, which has nothing to encrypt. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98511 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/nouveau: don't bump pin count on failed re-pin in nouveau_bo_pin_locked() nouveau_bo_pin_locked() checks whether an already pinned BO is in a memory domain compatible with a new pin request. When the domains are incompatible, it sets -EBUSY but still calls ttm_bo_pin() before returning. Callers treat a failed nouveau_bo_pin() as not having acquired a new pin, so the extra pin count is never decreased by a matching unpin. This triggers the warning in ttm_bo_release(): WARN_ON_ONCE(bo->pin_count); Found when fuzzing the nouveau driver with a modified Syzkaller: WARNING: drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo.c:256 at ttm_bo_release+0x827/0x9e0 drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo.c:256, CPU#1: syz.3.24/2212 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2212 Comm: syz.3.24 Not tainted 7.2.0 #24 PREEMPT(lazy) nouveau 0000:01:00.0: gsp:msg fn:103 len:0x40/0x20 res:0x19 resp:0x19 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:ttm_bo_release+0x827/0x9e0 drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo.c:256 Code: 02 00 0f 85 51 01 00 00 48 8b 7b 08 e8 d2 20 01 00 e9 80 fd ff ff e8 d8 15 c0 fe 90 0f 0b 90 e9 e1 f8 ff ff e8 ca 15 c0 fe 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 a4 f8 ff ff e8 bc 15 c0 fe be 03 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 msg: 00000000: 05 00 d0 c1 04 00 f0 f1 01 30 00 00 2d 90 00 00 .........0..-... RSP: 0018:ffffc9000f5cf710 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888018e5d2a8 RCX: ffffffff82bb1b36 RDX: ffff888017b68000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff888018e5d2a8 msg: 00000010: 19 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ RBP: ffff88801261c720 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10031cba55 R10: ffff888018e5d2ab R11: 00000000000000f3 R12: ffff888018e5d290 R13: ffff888018e5d2d4 R14: ffff88801b219c18 R15: dffffc0000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880e0f6f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b31223ffc CR3: 0000000028e00005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 80000000 Call Trace: <TASK> kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] ttm_bo_put drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo.c:325 [inline] ttm_bo_fini+0x55/0x80 drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo.c:330 nouveau_gem_object_del+0xb2/0x1b0 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_gem.c:90 drm_gem_object_free+0x5f/0x90 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem.c:1165 kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] __drm_gem_object_put include/drm/drm_gem.h:562 [inline] drm_gem_object_put include/drm/drm_gem.h:575 [inline] nouveau_abi16_chan_fini.constprop.0+0x44f/0x5a0 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_abi16.c:195 nouveau 0000:01:00.0: syz.2.23[2209]: Unknown handle 0x00000000 nouveau_abi16_fini+0x1d0/0x340 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_abi16.c:225 nouveau_drm_postclose+0x18b/0x3e0 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_drm.c:1284 nouveau 0000:01:00.0: syz.2.23[2209]: validate_init drm_file_free.part.0+0x6d6/0xb60 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_file.c:267 drm_file_free drivers/gpu/drm/drm_file.c:237 [inline] drm_close_helper.isra.0+0x11a/0x160 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_file.c:290 drm_release+0x1ab/0x330 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_file.c:438 __fput+0x39c/0xa60 fs/file_table.c:512 nouveau 0000:01:00.0: syz.2.23[2209]: validate: -2 task_work_run+0x15a/0x230 kernel/task_work.c:233 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:40 [inline] do_exit+0x82b/0x25a0 kernel/exit.c:1009 do_group_exit+0xc2/0x280 kernel/exit.c:1152 get_signal+0x1d6e/0x1f30 kernel/signal.c:3046 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x7d/0x6e0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337 __exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:66 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xdf/0x440 kernel/entry/common.c:101 __exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:230 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode include/linux/entry-common.h:318 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x4f8/0x690 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RI ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2026-93155 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: keembay - Fix AEAD unregister count in error path register_aes_algs() registers the AEAD algorithms before registering the skcipher algorithms. If skcipher registration fails, the function unwinds the earlier AEAD registration with crypto_engine_unregister_aeads(), but it passes ARRAY_SIZE(algs), which is the skcipher table size. Use ARRAY_SIZE(algs_aead) for the AEAD unwind path so the unregister helper iterates over the same table that was registered. Also clarify the nearby comment: the crypto registration helpers clean up algorithms registered within the same call, while this function must still unwind earlier successful registration steps. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93081 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: arm_scmi: Fix SCMI device destroy lifetimes scmi_child_dev_find() drops the reference returned by device_find_child() before returning the scmi_device pointer. A concurrent unregister can then release the device while the destroy path is still using the returned pointer. Make the lookup helper return the device_find_child() reference and keep it until scmi_device_destroy() has finished unregistering the child. Also split device_unregister() in __scmi_device_destroy() so the SCMI bus ID is not made reusable until after device_del() has removed the old scmi_dev.N name from sysfs. This avoids a new SCMI device reusing the same ID while the old device is still registered. The final device release callback is also a possible cleanup path when SCMI children are deleted by driver core recursion rather than __scmi_device_destroy(). Release the SCMI bus ID from a common helper used by destroy, register-failure and final-release paths, and clear scmi_dev->id after freeing it so the final release cannot free the same ID again. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93058 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/msm: Only fini scheduler after successful init msm_ringbuffer_new() destroys a partially initialized ring through msm_ringbuffer_destroy() when an allocation or scheduler setup step fails. If drm_sched_init() fails before it finishes initializing the scheduler, the failure path still calls drm_sched_fini(). That teardown path assumes the scheduler work items, lists, and workqueue state were initialized. Track successful scheduler initialization and call drm_sched_fini() only after drm_sched_init() returned 0. This issue was found by a static analysis checker and confirmed by manual source review. Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/738905/ | ||||
| CVE-2026-90385 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: md/raid1: create serial pool adding rdev to array with serialize_policy=1 The following bug has been observed with kernel 7.1.3 after adding a new rdev to an existing RAID1 array with serialize_policy enabled: Oops: 0002 [#1] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 19639 Comm: ext4lazyinit Not tainted 7.1.3-1-default RIP: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x27/0x50 CR2: 0000000000004960 Call Trace: wait_for_serialization+0xb9/0x260 [raid1] raid1_make_request+0x762/0xaff [raid1] md_handle_request+0x1c9/0x2e0 [md_mod] The raid1.c code calls wait_for_serialization() if the MD_SERIALIZE_POLICY is set, and wait_for_serialization assumes that rdev->serial is initialized. Normally this will be the case for arrays that have the serialize_policy sysfs attribute set to 1. But when a new rdev is added to an existing array in bind_rdev_to_array(), the condition at mddev_create_serial_pool() causes creation of rdev->serial to be skipped. Fix it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90368 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7915: unwind state on add_interface failure When mt76_wcid_alloc() fails, mt7915_add_interface() returned without clearing the vif_mask/omac_mask bits it had already set, without removing the firmware dev info added earlier, and without clearing a monitor_vif pointer to the vif mac80211 is about to free. mac80211 does not call remove_interface() for a failed add, so the indices and firmware dev entry leaked permanently and testmode could dereference the stale monitor_vif. Add a proper error unwind. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90311 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thermal: hwmon: Remove hwmon class device along with its parent The current code creates one hwmon device per thermal zone type and that device is registered under the first thermal zone of the given type. That turns out to be problematic when the thermal zone holding the hwmon device is removed. For example, say that there are two ACPI thermal zones on a system /sys/devices/virtual/thermal/thermal_zone0/ /sys/devices/virtual/thermal/thermal_zone1/ The current code registers a hwmon class device for thermal_zone0 only: /sys/devices/virtual/thermal/thermal_zone0/hwmon0/ because the type is "acpitz" for both of them, but it adds a sysfs attribute that belongs to thermal_zone1 under it: /sys/devices/virtual/thermal/thermal_zone0/hwmon0/temp2_input There is also /sys/devices/virtual/thermal/thermal_zone0/hwmon0/temp1_input which belongs to thermal_zone0. When thermal_zone0 is removed, say because the ACPI thermal driver is unbound from the underlying platform device, thermal_remove_hwmon_sysfs() skips the removal of hwmon0 because of the temp2_input attribute belonging to thermal_zone1 which effectively prevents thermal_zone0 removal from making progress. Address this by making thermal_remove_hwmon_sysfs() remove the entire hwmon class device interface for the given thermal zone type when the thermal zone device holding it is removed. To prevent races with thermal_add_hwmon_sysfs() that may interfere with this, carry out the entire addition and removal of hwmon sysfs interfaces for thermal zones under thermal_hwmon_list_lock. Also adjust the layout of the labels in thermal_add_hwmon_sysfs() to the current kernel coding style to align with the new "unlock" label. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90273 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: coresight: etm4x: missing cscfg_csdev_disable_active_config() in perf enable In the perf enable path, there are missing cases where cscfg_csdev_disable_active_config() is not called: - Branch broadcast is selected but not supported by the hardware - etm4_enable_hw() fails This can lead to a leak of config_desc->active_cnt. Fix this by properly calling cscfg_csdev_disable_active_config() in these error paths. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90138 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vsock: don't check the listener's sk_err in vsock_accept() Syzbot reported an issue which can be reproduced with these steps: r0 = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_STREAM, 0) bind(r0, {VMADDR_CID_ANY, PORT}) connect(r0, {VMADDR_CID_LOCAL, PORT}) -> -1, EPROTO (self-connect) listen(r0, backlog) -> 0 r1 = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_STREAM, 0) connect(r1, {VMADDR_CID_LOCAL, PORT}) -> 0 accept(r0) -> -1, EPROTO (stale sk_err) Basically, it creates a socket (r0) and triggers a self-connect after binding it. This self-connect fails with EPROTO because it loops back to r0 while the socket is still in the TCP_SYN_SENT state, causing it to be incorrectly dispatched to the connecting-client path. The unexpected packet type encountered there sets sk_err to EPROTO. After that, it invokes a listen() call on the same socket. This listen() call succeeds because the kernel's listening path never inspects or clears sk_err. Then, a new socket (r1) is created as a normal client and connects to r0. However, vsock_accept() rejects this incoming connection because the listener's sk_err still holds the EPROTO error from the earlier failed self-connect. This rejection causes the child socket created for r1's connection to never be freed on virtio or hyperv transports; only the VMCI transport implements pending_work to revisit and clean up a rejected socket. For a non-blocking connect(), vsock_connect() may return -EINPROGRESS immediately, and vsock_connect_timeout() can later set sk->sk_err asynchronously. Since no vsock transport ever sets sk_err on a socket while it is in TCP_LISTEN state, checking it in vsock_accept() serves no purpose and only carries forward errors left behind by earlier, unrelated connection attempts on the same socket. Remove the checks so accept() no longer rejects valid incoming connections because of a stale error, which also avoids the resource leak described above. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90061 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: skip double clone set expressions on element insert Both the dynset and newsetelem path clone the existing set expressions when setting set element expressions if no override expressions are provided. This results in a double clone, once to clone the template set expressions then another clone on the new element. Add a flag to annotate if userspace provides a override expression (ie. expression of the same type of the set but different configuration), otherwise borrow the existing expression from the set. Add conditionals to release expression iif they represent an override. Use this new override_exprs flag to dump the dynset expression override to userspace. This simplifies the existing logic and it also fixes a bug with the connlimit expression which results in a module refcount imbalance WARNING splat when resorting on the default set expressions. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89995 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dma-direct: return struct page from dma_direct_alloc_from_pool() Commit 5b138c534fda ("dma-direct: factor out a dma_direct_alloc_from_pool helper") changed dma_direct_alloc_from_pool() to return the CPU address from dma_alloc_from_pool(). That fits dma_direct_alloc(), but dma_direct_alloc_pages() also uses the helper and expects a struct page *. Fix this by making dma_direct_alloc_from_pool() return the struct page * again, and pass the CPU address back through an out-parameter for the dma_direct_alloc() caller. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89987 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/huge_memory: transfer the pmd dirty bit to the folio on zap zap_huge_pmd_folio() propagates the pmd young bit to the folio for the file case, but not the dirty bit. The pte path does propagate it, in zap_present_folio_ptes() and so does the pmd split path, in __split_huge_pmd_locked(). For most file mappings the omission is harmless, because writing to a shared file mapping goes through page_mkwrite(), which dirties the folio. tmpfs is different: it has no page_mkwrite(), and vma_wants_writenotify() is false for it, so a *read* fault on a MAP_SHARED tmpfs mapping installs a writable pmd via do_read_fault(). do_read_fault() does not call fault_dirty_shared_page(), so subsequent stores through that mapping set only the hardware dirty bit in the pmd and never call folio_mark_dirty(). A shmem folio allocated by a fault is marked uptodate but not dirty (see the clear: block in shmem_get_folio_gfp()), so PG_dirty is never set at all. Unmapping such a folio - munmap(), or exit_mmap() when the process dies - then loses the only record that it was written, because zap_huge_pmd() drops the pmd without transferring the dirty bit. Reclaim afterwards sees a clean shmem folio: the whole swap-out block in shrink_folio_list() is inside "if (folio_test_dirty(folio))", so pageout() is skipped and the folio falls into __remove_mapping(). There, folio_is_file_lru() is false for a swapbacked folio, so no shadow entry is created and __filemap_remove_folio(folio, NULL) simply empties the i_pages slot. The data is freed without ever being written to swap, and the next fault on that index returns a freshly zeroed folio. This is silent data loss for any process that keeps state in a MAP_SHARED tmpfs segment across an unmap - for example a cache handed from one process generation to the next through /dev/shm. It requires the folio to be PMD-mapped, so it only shows up once shmem THP is enabled (which is what we did in Meta fleet and started noticing crashes); with THP off the pte path transfers the dirty bit correctly. It also only becomes visible when swap is enabled, because with no swap device shmem folios (which are on the anon LRU) are not scanned by reclaim at all, so the clean folio is never dropped. Reproduced on x86_64 with a tmpfs mounted huge=within_size: read-fault a 2MB-backed region, write a known pattern through the resulting mapping, munmap, force reclaim of the cgroup, then re-map and read back. Without this patch the region reads back as zeros and vmstat shows zswpout 0 - the data was discarded rather than swapped. With this patch the region reads back correctly and the pages are swapped out as expected. With huge=never, or when the first touch is a write, the test passes either way. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89980 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: harmony: initialize locks before requesting IRQ snd_harmony_create() registers the IRQ before initializing h->lock and h->mixer_lock. A pending interrupt can invoke the handler while these locks are uninitialized. Initialize both locks before requesting the IRQ so the handler always sees valid lock state. | ||||