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Search Results (435 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-118990 | 1 Perl | 1 Callbackery | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| CallBackery versions before 0.62.0 for Perl leave a world-readable dump of the configuration database in /tmp when taking a configuration backup. getConfigBlob() has the sqlite3 shell write the dump to /tmp/cbdump<pid> and never removes it. The file takes the process umask, and a symlink planted at that predictable name is followed. The dump holds every user's password hash and every value saved by the application's forms. A local user can read these after any backup, and may redirect the dump to a file of their choosing. | ||||
| CVE-2026-62847 | 1 Metalama | 1 Metalama | 2026-10-30 | 8.2 High |
| Metalama is a Roslyn-based open-source patterns and architecture toolkit for C#. Prior to 2025.1.18, 2026.0.25 and 2026.1.19, Metalama.Framework and Metalama.Tool load and execute compile-time assemblies, auxiliary executable tools and embedded helper assemblies from predictable temporary directories. On `Linux` and `macOS`, the default `Path.GetTempPath()` location is world-writable, and existing artifacts are trusted based on sentinel or `.completed` marker files rather than integrity verification. A local unprivileged user on a shared machine or CI/build agent can pre-create the deterministic directory structure and plant a malicious DLL with the matching sentinel. When a higher-privileged developer or build account subsequently builds, Metalama skips regeneration and executes the planted artifact in the compiler, IDE or MSBuild process as the building user. This permits cross-user privilege escalation, reading source and secrets, supply-chain tampering with build output, or disrupting builds. Default Windows per-user temporary directories are protected by ACLs and are not affected. Deployer-selected insecure cache locations are outside the vulnerability's scope. This issue is fixed in versions 2025.1.18, 2026.0.25 and 2026.1.19. | ||||
| CVE-2013-1815 | 1 Redhat | 4 Openstack, Openstack Essex, Openstack Folsom and 1 more | 2026-10-30 | 6.1 Medium |
| A flaw was found in PackStack. This vulnerability allows a local user to modify deployed systems by changing the answer file, which is created in insecure directories such as /tmp or the current working directory. This insecure file creation could lead to unauthorized system modifications. | ||||
| CVE-2026-119193 | 1 Sebastianbergmann | 1 Phpunit | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| PHPUnit is a testing framework for PHP. From 13.4.0 until 13.4.4, the TestCase::coverageFilesDirectory() logic in src/Runner/Phpt/TestCase.php creates temporary files for PHPT code coverage in a predictable phpunit-phpt directory under sys_get_temp_dir() and reuses that directory without verifying its ownership or permissions. On multi-user systems with a shared temporary path, a local attacker who creates the directory before the developer runs PHPT tests with code coverage can replace the generated job file before the child process executes it with require, allowing arbitrary code execution with the developer's privileges while the test and coverage report appear successful. PHPUnit 12.5 and earlier, default macOS and Windows configurations with per-user temporary directories, and single-user environments where another user cannot create files in the temporary path are not affected. This issue is fixed in 13.4.4. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97209 | 1 Elixir-lang | 1 Elixir | 2026-10-30 | N/A |
| Insecure Temporary File vulnerability in Mix deps.partition in Elixir allows a local user to execute code as another user via a swapped partition config file. Partitioned dependency compilation passes the project configuration to each partition VM through a file in a fixed-name directory under the shared system temporary directory, and the partition trusts what it reads back. Another local user on the same host can exploit this during a mix deps.compile run that uses partitioned compilation. Mix.Tasks.Deps.Partition.server/4 in lib/mix/lib/mix/tasks/deps.partition.ex creates the directory with File.mkdir_p/1, which accepts an existing directory without checking its owner, so a user who created it first can replace the file before client/0 reads it. This issue affects mix: from 1.20.0-rc.4 before 1.20.5. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46148 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spi: microchip-core-qspi: control built-in cs manually The coreQSPI IP supports only a single chip select, which is automagically operated by the hardware - set low when the transmit buffer first gets written to and set high when the number of bytes written to the TOTALBYTES field of the FRAMES register have been sent on the bus. Additional devices must use GPIOs for their chip selects. It was reported to me that if there are two devices attached to this QSPI controller that the in-built chip select is set low while linux tries to access the device attached to the GPIO. This went undetected as the boards that connected multiple devices to the SPI controller all exclusively used GPIOs for chip selects, not relying on the built-in chip select at all. It turns out that this was because the built-in chip select, when controlled automagically, is set low when active and high when inactive, thereby ruling out its use for active-high devices or devices that need to transmit with the chip select disabled. Modify the driver so that it controls chip select directly, retaining the behaviour for mem_ops of setting the chip select active for the entire duration of the transfer in the exec_op callback. For regular transfers, implement the set_cs callback for the core to use. As part of this, the existing setup callback, mchp_coreqspi_setup_op(), is removed. Modifying the CLKIDLE field is not safe to do during operation when there are multiple devices, so this code is removed entirely. Setting the MASTER and ENABLE fields is something that can be done once at probe, it doesn't need to be re-run for each device. Instead the new setup callback sets the built-in chip select to its inactive state for active-low devices, as the reset value of the chip select in software controlled mode is low. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43352 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i3c: mipi-i3c-hci: Correct RING_CTRL_ABORT handling in DMA dequeue The logic used to abort the DMA ring contains several flaws: 1. The driver unconditionally issues a ring abort even when the ring has already stopped. 2. The completion used to wait for abort completion is never re-initialized, resulting in incorrect wait behavior. 3. The abort sequence unintentionally clears RING_CTRL_ENABLE, which resets hardware ring pointers and disrupts the controller state. 4. If the ring is already stopped, the abort operation should be considered successful without attempting further action. Fix the abort handling by checking whether the ring is running before issuing an abort, re-initializing the completion when needed, ensuring that RING_CTRL_ENABLE remains asserted during abort, and treating an already stopped ring as a successful condition. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43009 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix incorrect pruning due to atomic fetch precision tracking When backtrack_insn encounters a BPF_STX instruction with BPF_ATOMIC and BPF_FETCH, the src register (or r0 for BPF_CMPXCHG) also acts as a destination, thus receiving the old value from the memory location. The current backtracking logic does not account for this. It treats atomic fetch operations the same as regular stores where the src register is only an input. This leads the backtrack_insn to fail to propagate precision to the stack location, which is then not marked as precise! Later, the verifier's path pruning can incorrectly consider two states equivalent when they differ in terms of stack state. Meaning, two branches can be treated as equivalent and thus get pruned when they should not be seen as such. Fix it as follows: Extend the BPF_LDX handling in backtrack_insn to also cover atomic fetch operations via is_atomic_fetch_insn() helper. When the fetch dst register is being tracked for precision, clear it, and propagate precision over to the stack slot. For non-stack memory, the precision walk stops at the atomic instruction, same as regular BPF_LDX. This covers all fetch variants. Before: 0: (b7) r1 = 8 ; R1=8 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 ; R1=8 R10=fp0 fp-8=8 2: (b7) r2 = 0 ; R2=0 3: (db) r2 = atomic64_fetch_add((u64 *)(r10 -8), r2) ; R2=8 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm 4: (bf) r3 = r10 ; R3=fp0 R10=fp0 5: (0f) r3 += r2 mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 5 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1 mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2 stack= before 4: (bf) r3 = r10 mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2 stack= before 3: (db) r2 = atomic64_fetch_add((u64 *)(r10 -8), r2) mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2 stack= before 2: (b7) r2 = 0 6: R2=8 R3=fp8 6: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0=0 7: (95) exit After: 0: (b7) r1 = 8 ; R1=8 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 ; R1=8 R10=fp0 fp-8=8 2: (b7) r2 = 0 ; R2=0 3: (db) r2 = atomic64_fetch_add((u64 *)(r10 -8), r2) ; R2=8 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm 4: (bf) r3 = r10 ; R3=fp0 R10=fp0 5: (0f) r3 += r2 mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 5 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1 mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2 stack= before 4: (bf) r3 = r10 mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2 stack= before 3: (db) r2 = atomic64_fetch_add((u64 *)(r10 -8), r2) mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-8 before 2: (b7) r2 = 0 mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-8 before 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 mark_precise: frame0: regs=r1 stack= before 0: (b7) r1 = 8 6: R2=8 R3=fp8 6: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0=0 7: (95) exit | ||||
| CVE-2026-23371 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-30 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/deadline: Fix missing ENQUEUE_REPLENISH during PI de-boosting Running stress-ng --schedpolicy 0 on an RT kernel on a big machine might lead to the following WARNINGs (edited). sched: DL de-boosted task PID 22725: REPLENISH flag missing WARNING: CPU: 93 PID: 0 at kernel/sched/deadline.c:239 dequeue_task_dl+0x15c/0x1f8 ... (running_bw underflow) Call trace: dequeue_task_dl+0x15c/0x1f8 (P) dequeue_task+0x80/0x168 deactivate_task+0x24/0x50 push_dl_task+0x264/0x2e0 dl_task_timer+0x1b0/0x228 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x188/0x378 hrtimer_interrupt+0xfc/0x260 ... The problem is that when a SCHED_DEADLINE task (lock holder) is changed to a lower priority class via sched_setscheduler(), it may fail to properly inherit the parameters of potential DEADLINE donors if it didn't already inherit them in the past (shorter deadline than donor's at that time). This might lead to bandwidth accounting corruption, as enqueue_task_dl() won't recognize the lock holder as boosted. The scenario occurs when: 1. A DEADLINE task (donor) blocks on a PI mutex held by another DEADLINE task (holder), but the holder doesn't inherit parameters (e.g., it already has a shorter deadline) 2. sched_setscheduler() changes the holder from DEADLINE to a lower class while still holding the mutex 3. The holder should now inherit DEADLINE parameters from the donor and be enqueued with ENQUEUE_REPLENISH, but this doesn't happen Fix the issue by introducing __setscheduler_dl_pi(), which detects when a DEADLINE (proper or boosted) task gets setscheduled to a lower priority class. In case, the function makes the task inherit DEADLINE parameters of the donoer (pi_se) and sets ENQUEUE_REPLENISH flag to ensure proper bandwidth accounting during the next enqueue operation. | ||||
| CVE-2026-119140 | 1 Bytecodealliance | 1 Wasmtime | 2026-10-29 | 4.8 Medium |
| Wasmtime 46.0.0 before 48.0.6 and 49.0.0 before 49.0.3 contains a denial of service vulnerability that allows malicious components to panic the host via thread.yield in start functions. Attackers can supply a component whose start function calls an async-lowered import then thread.yield, causing an undisposed fiber drop that crashes embedders. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93864 | 1 Watchguard | 1 Fireware Os | 2026-10-29 | N/A |
| A link following vulnerability in WatchGuard Fireware OS’s firewall daemon allows a local attacker with code execution as a low-privileged system process to overwrite arbitrary files with root privileges, and to tamper with firewall IP set data, by planting a crafted file system object and triggering a list update. Written content is partially constrained. | ||||
| CVE-2026-113713 | 1 Pypa | 1 Virtualenv | 2026-10-27 | 6.7 Medium |
| virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. From 21.14.8 until 21.14.10, the app-data seeder can leave an environment linked to temporary package files that virtualenv deletes when creation finishes. The environment-variable and configuration-file forms of symlink_app_data can enable this state even though the command-line flag is disabled for temporary app-data. The resulting environment depends on a cache pathname that its owner no longer controls. This issue is fixed in version 21.14.10. | ||||
| CVE-2026-20649 | 1 Apple | 6 Ios And Ipados, Ipados, Iphone Os and 3 more | 2026-10-27 | 5.5 Medium |
| A logging issue was addressed with improved data redaction. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.3 and iPadOS 26.3, macOS Sequoia 15.8.2, macOS Tahoe 26.3, tvOS 26.3, watchOS 26.3. A user may be able to view sensitive user information. | ||||
| CVE-2026-112421 | 1 Apple | 1 Macos | 2026-10-26 | N/A |
| A race condition was addressed with improved handling of symbolic links. This issue is fixed in macOS Golden Gate 27.2, macOS Sequoia 15.8.2, macOS Tahoe 26.7.2. An app may be able to modify protected parts of the file system. | ||||
| CVE-2026-76497 | 1 Cisco | 1 Expressway Series | 2026-10-22 | 6.6 Medium |
| As part of Cisco's ongoing commitment to proactive security and product quality, the Cisco Expressway Series software engineering team has conducted a comprehensive internal security review. This review resulted in software hardening releases that address multiple internally discovered vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities tracked by CVE-2026-76497 are related to issues concerning insecure temporary files that are grouped under the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) Base CWE-377. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46014 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SVM: Add missing save/restore handling of LBR MSRs MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR and LBR MSRs are currently not enumerated by KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST, and LBR MSRs cannot be set with KVM_SET_MSRS. So save/restore is completely broken. Fix it by adding the MSRs to msrs_to_save_base, and allowing writes to LBR MSRs from userspace only (as they are read-only MSRs) if LBR virtualization is enabled. Additionally, to correctly restore L1's LBRs while L2 is running, make sure the LBRs are copied from the captured VMCB01 save area in svm_copy_vmrun_state(). Note, for VMX, this also fixes a flaw where MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR isn't reported as an MSR to save/restore. Note #2, over-reporting MSR_IA32_LASTxxx on Intel is ok, as KVM already handles unsupported reads and writes thanks to commit b5e2fec0ebc3 ("KVM: Ignore DEBUGCTL MSRs with no effect") (kvm_do_msr_access() will morph the unsupported userspace write into a nop). [sean: guard with lbrv checks, massage changelog] | ||||
| CVE-2026-55480 | 1 Openprinting | 1 Cups | 2026-10-20 | 5.7 Medium |
| OpenPrinting CUPS is an open source printing system for Linux and other Unix-like operating systems. Prior to 2.4.20, copy_model() in scheduler/ipp.c creates a predictable TempDir/<connection-number>.ppd path in an lp-group-writable directory and opens it as root without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW. Exploitation requires an lp-group process able to write that directory to predict the connection-derived name and plant a symlink before the root open, while a privileged add-printer or modify-printer operation using a model PPD triggers copy_model(). The reporter treats an existing lp foothold and the privileged operation as distinct prerequisites, while the maintainer assesses high privileges because installing the relevant filter or administering the printer requires root or print-administrator access. If the race succeeds, the root scheduler follows the symlink and truncates or overwrites a root-writable target with generated PPD data, compromising file integrity or availability. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.20. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46271 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath12k: do WoW offloads only on primary link In case of multi-link connection, WCN7850 firmware crashes due to WoW offloads enabled on both primary and secondary links. Change to do it only on primary link to fix it. Tested-on: WCN7850 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HMT.1.1.c5-00284-QCAHMTSWPL_V1.0_V2.0_SILICONZ-1 | ||||
| CVE-2026-46115 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: add pgmap check to biovec_phys_mergeable biovec_phys_mergeable() is used by the request merge, DMA mapping, and integrity merge paths to decide if two physically contiguous bvec segments can be coalesced into one. It currently has no check for whether the segments belong to different dev_pagemaps. When zone device memory is registered in multiple chunks, each chunk gets its own dev_pagemap. A single bio can legitimately contain bvecs from different pgmaps -- iov_iter_extract_bvecs() breaks at pgmap boundaries but the outer loop in bio_iov_iter_get_pages() continues filling the same bio. If such bvecs are physically contiguous, biovec_phys_mergeable() will coalesce them, making it impossible to recover the correct pgmap for the merged segment via page_pgmap(). Add a zone_device_pages_have_same_pgmap() check to prevent merging bvec segments that span different pgmaps. | ||||
| CVE-2026-45988 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-19 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix re-decryption of RESPONSE packets If a RESPONSE packet gets a temporary failure during processing, it may end up in a partially decrypted state - and then get requeued for a retry. Fix this by just discarding the packet; we will send another CHALLENGE packet and thereby elicit a further response. Similarly, discard an incoming CHALLENGE packet if we get an error whilst generating a RESPONSE; the server will send another CHALLENGE. | ||||