| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: fix lock leak on ENOMEM in AMDGPU_GEM_OP_GET_MAPPING_INFO
The AMDGPU_GEM_OP_GET_MAPPING_INFO branch of amdgpu_gem_op_ioctl()
holds three cleanup-tracked resources before calling kvcalloc():
the drm_gem_object reference from drm_gem_object_lookup(), the
drm_exec lock on the looked-up GEM via drm_exec_lock_obj(), and
the drm_exec lock on the per-process VM root page directory via
amdgpu_vm_lock_pd(). All three are released by the out_exec
label that every other error path in this function jumps to.
The kvcalloc() failure path returns -ENOMEM directly, skipping
out_exec and leaking all three.
The leaked per-process VM root PD dma_resv lock is the
load-bearing leak: any subsequent operation on the same VM
(further GEM ops, command-submission, eviction, TTM shrinker
callbacks) blocks on the held lock. DRM_IOCTL_AMDGPU_GEM_OP is
DRM_AUTH | DRM_RENDER_ALLOW, so this is an unprivileged-local
denial of service against the caller's GPU context, reachable
by any process with /dev/dri/renderD* access.
Route the failure through out_exec so drm_exec_fini() and
drm_gem_object_put() run.
Reproduced on stock 7.0.0-10, Ryzen 7 5700U / Radeon Vega
(Lucienne): the failing ioctl returns -ENOMEM and a second
GET_MAPPING_INFO on the same fd then blocks in
drm_exec_lock_obj() on the leaked dma_resv. SIGKILL on the
caller does not reap the task; the fd-release path during
process exit goes through amdgpu_gem_object_close() ->
drm_exec_prepare_obj() on the same lock, leaving the task in D
state until the box is rebooted. The patched kernel was not
rebuilt and re-tested on this hardware; the fix is mechanical.
Tested on a single Lucienne / Vega box only.
Ziyi Guo posted an independent INT_MAX-bound check for
args->num_entries in the same branch [1]; the two patches are
complementary and can land in either order.
(cherry picked from commit b69d3256d79de15f54c322986ff4da68f1d65b0a) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/vmalloc: do not trigger BUG() on BH disabled context
__get_vm_area_node() currently triggers a BUG() if in_interrupt() returns
true. However, in_interrupt() also reports true when BH are disabled.
The bridge code can call rhashtable_lookup_insert_fast() with bottom
halves disabled:
__vlan_add()
-> br_fdb_add_local()
spin_lock_bh(&br->hash_lock); <-- Disable BH
-> fdb_add_local()
-> fdb_create()
-> rhashtable_lookup_insert_fast()
-> kvmalloc()
-> vmalloc()
-> __get_vm_area_node()
-> BUG_ON(in_interrupt())
spin_unlock_bh(&br->hash_lock)
this triggers the BUG() despite the caller not being in NMI or
hard IRQ context.
Replace the in_interrupt() check with in_nmi() || in_hardirq(). |
| A flaw was found in the UMA resource registration endpoint of the keycloak-services component, which provides the core logic for Keycloak's authorization and identity services. The issue occurs when remote resource management is enabled, allowing an authenticated user with specific permissions to update resources they do not own by providing a target resource ID in a request. This can lead to unauthorized modification of resource configurations, such as names, URIs, and scopes. |
| CoreShop through 1.5.5 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the OrderController that allows authenticated customers to act on other customers' orders by supplying user-controlled ids. Attackers can omit the data field in OrderConfirm or supply another reshipId to SendReship to confirm receipt of others' orders and overwrite return tracking details. |
| The Redis server command parser in Apache bRPC accepts an empty RESP array as a command header. A remote unauthenticated attacker who can reach a bRPC server with Redis service enabled can send an empty array header followed by a bulk string, causing an out-of-bounds write in the parser and crashing the process.
Root Cause:
RedisCommandParser::ConsumeImpl rejected negative RESP array counts but accepted zero. It resized the command argument vector to zero elements and continued parsing. When a following bulk string was parsed, the only index guard was a CHECK. In configurations where fatal logs do not abort immediately, execution could continue and write to _args[0] even though the vector was empty.
Affected Scenarios:
Deployments that enable ServerOptions.redis_service and accept Redis protocol traffic from untrusted clients. The issue is reached during parsing before command handling or authentication.
How to Fix:
1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.
2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3354
Note:
The fix rejects empty RESP arrays as invalid Redis commands and replaces the internal index CHECK with an explicit parse error so malformed command streams cannot fall through to an indexed vector write. |
| Uncontrolled recursion in the AMF parser in Apache bRPC < 1.18.0 allows a remote RTMP peer to crash a bRPC process by sending deeply nested AMF objects or arrays. The parser recursively processed nested AMF containers without enforcing a depth limit, which could exhaust the native stack.
Affected Scenarios:
Applications using bRPC RTMP support and parsing AMF data from an untrusted RTMP peer. This includes RTMP servers parsing client command messages, RTMP clients parsing server responses or status messages, and either side parsing inbound AMF script data such as metadata or cue points. Direct callers of ReadAMFObject or ReadAMFArray on untrusted input are also affected.
How to Fix:
1. Upgrade Apache bRPC to 1.18.0.
2. Apply the patch from PR https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3344 .
Note:
The fix introduces a configurable AMF nesting depth limit with default value 128. AMF objects or arrays deeper than amf_max_depth are rejected after applying the fix. |
| Uncontrolled recursion in the Redis reply parser in Apache bRPC < 1.18.0 allows a remote Redis server peer to crash a bRPC Redis client process by returning a deeply nested RESP array reply. The parser recursed once for each nested array level without enforcing a depth limit. The fix adds a configurable Redis reply depth limit with default value 128 and rejects replies exceeding that limit.
Affected Scenarios:
Applications using bRPC as a Redis client with ChannelOptions.protocol="redis" and receiving replies from an untrusted or faulty Redis server peer.
How to Fix:
1. Upgrade Apache bRPC to 1.18.0.
2. Apply the patch from PR https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3344 .
Note:
After applying the fix, Redis replies with array nesting deeper than redis_max_reply_depth are rejected. |
| Uncontrolled recursion in the HTTP/2 HPACK decoder in Apache bRPC before 1.18.0 allows remote attackers to cause denial of service by sending a crafted HTTP/2 header block containing many consecutive Dynamic Table Size Update entries. Each update was decoded by recursively invoking the HPACK decoder, which could exhaust the thread stack before a header field or end of input was reached.
Root Cause:
The bRPC HPACK decoder recursively decoded the next entry after processing a Dynamic Table Size Update. The decoder did not bound the recursion depth, so a long sequence of update entries could consume excessive stack space.
Affected Scenarios:
Use bRPC with the built-in HTTP/2 implementation to accept HTTP/2 traffic from an untrusted network.
How to Fix:
1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.
2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3343
Note:
The fix changes HPACK Dynamic Table Size Update decoding to use iterative parsing instead of recursive parsing. |
| RuoYi-Vue-Plus through 6.0.0 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in SysUserServiceImpl.selectUserListByDept that allows authenticated users to read users of other departments. Users holding system:user:list under a department-restricted role can request GET /system/user/list/dept/{deptId} with any department id to obtain usernames, nicknames, account status, last login IP and time, and remarks. |
| Blossom through 1.17.1 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability that allows authenticated non-readonly users to modify other users' pictures by supplying arbitrary picture ids. Attackers can call the picture delete, /picture/del/batch, or /picture/star endpoints to permanently delete victims' images and stored files or change their star status. |
| DBI versions before 1.656 for Perl hang on a later open of a DBD::DBM table because a failed open_data does not release the table's lock.
open_data creates the table's lock file and takes an exclusive flock on it for a CREATE, before the checks that can croak: a dbm_mldbm value that is not a module name, a failing tie, or a missing data file. The croak unwinds before the table object is blessed, so nothing releases the lock, and the meta data holding the open descriptor stays cached on the database handle.
The dbm_mldbm and dbm_type values come from the DSN or the connect attributes, so a caller that chooses the serializer or the storage backend can trigger the failure.
The flock has no timeout, so a later open of that table (even through a separate database handle) blocks for as long as the handle holding the stale lock lives, in the same process or any other. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix potential deadlock when reconnecting channels
Fix cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect() to take the correct lock order
and prevent the following deadlock from happening
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.16.0-rc3-build2+ #1301 Tainted: G S W
------------------------------------------------------
cifsd/6055 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88810ad56038 (&tcp_ses->srv_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x134/0x200
but task is already holding lock:
ffff888119c64330 (&ret_buf->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0xcf/0x200
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (&ret_buf->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
validate_chain+0x1cf/0x270
__lock_acquire+0x60e/0x780
lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x1f0
_raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40
cifs_setup_session+0x81/0x4b0
cifs_get_smb_ses+0x771/0x900
cifs_mount_get_session+0x7e/0x170
cifs_mount+0x92/0x2d0
cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x161/0x460
smb3_get_tree+0x55/0x90
vfs_get_tree+0x46/0x180
do_new_mount+0x1b0/0x2e0
path_mount+0x6ee/0x740
do_mount+0x98/0xe0
__do_sys_mount+0x148/0x180
do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
-> #1 (&ret_buf->ses_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
validate_chain+0x1cf/0x270
__lock_acquire+0x60e/0x780
lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x1f0
_raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40
cifs_match_super+0x101/0x320
sget+0xab/0x270
cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x1e0/0x460
smb3_get_tree+0x55/0x90
vfs_get_tree+0x46/0x180
do_new_mount+0x1b0/0x2e0
path_mount+0x6ee/0x740
do_mount+0x98/0xe0
__do_sys_mount+0x148/0x180
do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
-> #0 (&tcp_ses->srv_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
check_noncircular+0x95/0xc0
check_prev_add+0x115/0x2f0
validate_chain+0x1cf/0x270
__lock_acquire+0x60e/0x780
lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x1f0
_raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40
cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x134/0x200
__cifs_reconnect+0x8f/0x500
cifs_handle_standard+0x112/0x280
cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x64d/0xbc0
kthread+0x2f7/0x310
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x230
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
&tcp_ses->srv_lock --> &ret_buf->ses_lock --> &ret_buf->chan_lock
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&ret_buf->chan_lock);
lock(&ret_buf->ses_lock);
lock(&ret_buf->chan_lock);
lock(&tcp_ses->srv_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by cifsd/6055:
#0: ffffffff857de398 (&cifs_tcp_ses_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x7b/0x200
#1: ffff888119c64060 (&ret_buf->ses_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x9c/0x200
#2: ffff888119c64330 (&ret_buf->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0xcf/0x200 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: add srng->lock for ath11k_hal_srng_* in monitor mode
ath11k_hal_srng_* should be used with srng->lock to protect srng data.
For ath11k_dp_rx_mon_dest_process() and ath11k_dp_full_mon_process_rx(),
they use ath11k_hal_srng_* for many times but never call srng->lock.
So when running (full) monitor mode, warning will occur:
RIP: 0010:ath11k_hal_srng_dst_peek+0x18/0x30 [ath11k]
Call Trace:
? ath11k_hal_srng_dst_peek+0x18/0x30 [ath11k]
ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_status+0xc45/0x1190 [ath11k]
? idr_alloc_u32+0x97/0xd0
ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_rings+0x32a/0x550 [ath11k]
ath11k_dp_service_srng+0x289/0x5a0 [ath11k]
ath11k_pcic_ext_grp_napi_poll+0x30/0xd0 [ath11k]
__napi_poll+0x30/0x1f0
net_rx_action+0x198/0x320
__do_softirq+0xdd/0x319
So add srng->lock for them to avoid such warnings.
Inorder to fetch the srng->lock, should change srng's definition from
'void' to 'struct hal_srng'. And initialize them elsewhere to prevent
one line of code from being too long. This is consistent with other ring
process functions, such as ath11k_dp_process_rx().
Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03125-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-3.6510.30
Tested-on: QCN9074 hw1.0 PCI WLAN.HK.2.7.0.1-01744-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: initialize close_work early to avoid warning
We encountered a warning that close_work was canceled before
initialization.
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 111103 at kernel/workqueue.c:3047 __flush_work+0x19e/0x1b0
Workqueue: events smc_lgr_terminate_work [smc]
RIP: 0010:__flush_work+0x19e/0x1b0
Call Trace:
? __wake_up_common+0x7a/0x190
? work_busy+0x80/0x80
__cancel_work_timer+0xe3/0x160
smc_close_cancel_work+0x1a/0x70 [smc]
smc_close_active_abort+0x207/0x360 [smc]
__smc_lgr_terminate.part.38+0xc8/0x180 [smc]
process_one_work+0x19e/0x340
worker_thread+0x30/0x370
? process_one_work+0x340/0x340
kthread+0x117/0x130
? __kthread_cancel_work+0x50/0x50
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
This is because when smc_close_cancel_work is triggered, e.g. the RDMA
driver is rmmod and the LGR is terminated, the conn->close_work is
flushed before initialization, resulting in WARN_ON(!work->func).
__smc_lgr_terminate | smc_connect_{rdma|ism}
-------------------------------------------------------------
| smc_conn_create
| \- smc_lgr_register_conn
for conn in lgr->conns_all |
\- smc_conn_kill |
\- smc_close_active_abort |
\- smc_close_cancel_work |
\- cancel_work_sync |
\- __flush_work |
(close_work) |
| smc_close_init
| \- INIT_WORK(&close_work)
So fix this by initializing close_work before establishing the
connection. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vc4: hdmi: Move packet RAM enable to PM runtime
Audio can be triggered by the HPD handler and start up before video has
been restored, calling vc4_hdmi_write_infoframe() for the audio infoframe.
vc4_hdmi_write_infoframe() needs Packet RAM to be on to store the
infoframe, however, if the video hasn't been enabled,
vc4_hdmi_encoder_post_crtc_enable() hasn't been called and therefore, the
Packet RAM can be disabled by the time vc4_hdmi_write_infoframe() executes,
causing the following splat:
[ 201.570266] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 201.570293] Packet RAM has to be on to store the packet.
[ 201.570367] WARNING: drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi.c:683 at vc4_hdmi_write_infoframe+0x404/0x494 [vc4], CPU#0: wireplumber/1606
[...]
[ 201.658650] Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B Rev 1.5 (DT)
[...]
[ 201.758499] Call trace:
[ 201.760967] vc4_hdmi_write_infoframe+0x404/0x494 [vc4] (P)
[ 201.766607] vc4_hdmi_write_audio_infoframe+0x1c/0x28 [vc4]
[ 201.772247] write_infoframe+0xbc/0x140 [drm_display_helper]
[ 201.777975] drm_atomic_helper_connector_hdmi_update_audio_infoframe+0x80/0xdc [drm_display_helper]
[ 201.787140] vc4_hdmi_audio_prepare+0x4ac/0x570 [vc4]
[ 201.792252] drm_connector_hdmi_audio_prepare+0x24/0x30 [drm_display_helper]
[ 201.799390] hdmi_codec_prepare+0x100/0x160 [snd_soc_hdmi_codec]
[ 201.805471] snd_soc_pcm_dai_prepare+0xd4/0x100 [snd_soc_core]
[ 201.811375] __soc_pcm_prepare+0x60/0x12c [snd_soc_core]
[ 201.816752] soc_pcm_prepare+0x34/0x58 [snd_soc_core]
[ 201.821863] snd_pcm_do_prepare+0x70/0x8c [snd_pcm]
[ 201.826798] snd_pcm_action_nonatomic+0xe4/0x174 [snd_pcm]
[ 201.832350] snd_pcm_prepare+0xc8/0xd8 [snd_pcm]
[ 201.837021] snd_pcm_common_ioctl+0x458/0x614 [snd_pcm]
[ 201.842308] snd_pcm_ioctl+0x30/0x48 [snd_pcm]
[ 201.846802] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xd8
[ 201.850769] invoke_syscall+0x48/0xf4
[ 201.854470] el0_svc_common+0x80/0xd8
[ 201.858171] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
[ 201.861520] el0_svc+0x3c/0xb0
[ 201.864605] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xdc
[ 201.868834] el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
[ 201.872536] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Considering that Packet RAM enable is essentially a power management
configuration, move its enabling/disabling to the Runtime PM hooks.
Note that post_crtc_disable() still stops all infoframes, but keeps Packet
RAM enabled, leaving it to be disabled by runtime suspend. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock: treat TCP_CLOSING as once-established
Handle the TCP_ESTABLISHED -> TCP_CLOSING transition on OP_RST, which can
race with the connect loop. Immediately break and return 0 on
ESTABLISHED/CLOSING. The return value of connect() should reflect what
happened up to the point the connection was established or failed. Events
that occur afterwards must not affect it. E.g. even if OP_RW has already
set sk_err, connect() should still return 0, not ENOBUFS because of it.
Adapt the inaccurate comment above signal_pending().
Resetting a socket that is still present in connected_table can lead to
memory corruption. The reporter noted lost transports for in-flight skbs,
and I have reproduced crashes caused by re-insertion into connected_table.
list_add double add: new=, prev=, next=.
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:35!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
Workqueue: vsock-loopback vsock_loopback_work
RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x11f/0x130
Call Trace:
vsock_insert_connected.cold+0xe/0x13
virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x10e9/0x1460
vsock_loopback_work+0x305/0x480
process_one_work+0xe4c/0x1560
worker_thread+0x4f1/0xd60
kthread+0x36e/0x470
ret_from_fork+0x47b/0x6b0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
This fix is supplementary to commit 002541ef650b ("vsock: Ignore
signal/timeout on connect() if already established"). Details under Link. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
futex: Fix mm reuse handling for FUT_OFF_MMSHARED
A FUT_OFF_MMSHARED futex is a shared futex that refers to an MM.
It is possible for a process to wait on a shared futex with a different MM
because a FUT_OFF_INODE waiter can be requeued onto a FUT_OFF_MMSHARED
futex by another process.
This can cause FUT_OFF_MMSHARED waiters on a freed MM to consume
wakeups intended for a newly allocated MM at the same address.
Fix it by keying FUT_OFF_MMSHARED using a unique 64-bit per-MM ID.
Leave private futexes as before to avoid influencing the performance of the
hotpath.
(Multi-threaded processes typically implicitly use FUT_OFF_MMSHARED by
setting clear_child_tid such that it points into anonymous memory, which
causes mm_release() in a multi-threaded mm to perform FUTEX_WAKE.) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ring-buffer: Do not show buffer_meta for CPUs without a buffer
The per_cpu/cpuN/buffer_meta files are created for every possible CPU,
but buffer->buffers[cpu] is only allocated once that CPU comes online.
Reading the file of a CPU that never came online dereferences a NULL
cpu_buffer in rbm_start().
Fail the open with -ENODEV when the CPU has no buffer, as the other
per CPU ring buffer interfaces do. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ring-buffer: Fix false warning in ring_buffer_map_get_reader()
The mmap reader can warn when it catches up with a writer that is still
committing events. rb_get_reader_page() returns NULL in this case, but
ring_buffer_map_get_reader() treats that result as an error.
The initial rb_per_cpu_empty() check filters out an empty buffer, but it
does not guarantee that the next reader page has committed data. Writers
do not take reader_lock and can advance commit_page before publishing the
committed length on the new page. rb_get_reader_page() can swap to that
page, catch up with the writer and return NULL.
Handle NULL through the existing no-data exit without warning. Remove the
caller's reader_page == commit_page check as well, since the reader-page
helper already handles that case. The existing metadata update and return
path remain in place. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/exec: don't immediately add prelocked obj to array of locked objs
When a contention is detected the drm_exec object grabs a reference to
the contended object, unlocks all other objects and pre-locks the
contended one before anything else.
The problem is that it is possible that this pre-locked object was about
to be destroyed and drm_exec is now holding the last reference to it.
So we never actually see this pre-locked object again to be explicitly
locked and so also never reserve a slot for a dma_fence object on it.
Should the driver now use drm_exec_for_each_locked_object() to add a new
fence to all locked objects we eventually see a warning or even a
BUG_ON() to prevent random memory corruption.
Fix this by keeping the prelocked object out of the array of locked objs
until it was explicitly mentioned by the driver again.
If the prelocked object is never mentioned again by the driver
just unlock and drop the reference at the end of the locking loop. |
