| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/client: validate new EOF for insert range
smb3_insert_range() does not check if the new file size
(i_size + len) is valid. This allows FALLOC_FL_INSERT_RANGE to bypass
RLIMIT_FSIZE, exceed s_maxbytes, or produce a size outside the loff_t
range.
Use check_add_overflow() to calculate the new EOF. Validate it with
inode_newsize_ok() before modifying the file.
Reproducer, using a file on a CIFS mount:
bash -c '
FILE=/mnt/cifs/repro
trap "" SIGXFSZ
ulimit -f 3072 # RLIMIT_FSIZE = 3 MiB
# A regular write is stopped at 3 MiB.
dd if=/dev/zero of="$FILE" bs=1M count=4 status=none
stat -c "size after write: %s" "$FILE"
# Insert 2 MiB into a 2 MiB file.
truncate -s 2M "$FILE"
fallocate -i -o 0 -l 2M "$FILE"
stat -c "size after insert: %s" "$FILE"
'
Before this change, the regular write stops at the 3 MiB limit, but
insert range grows the file to 4 MiB:
dd: error writing '/mnt/cifs/repro': File too large
size after write: 3145728
size after insert: 4194304
After this change, insert range also fails at the limit and leaves the
2 MiB file unchanged:
dd: error writing '/mnt/cifs/repro': File too large
size after write: 3145728
fallocate: fallocate failed: File too large
size after insert: 2097152 |
| Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in Mamunur Rashid Classified Listing classified-listing allows Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs.This issue affects Classified Listing: from n/a through 6.1.5. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: reject oversized tx_queue_len at netlink parse time
rtnl_create_link() assigns IFLA_TXQLEN directly to dev->tx_queue_len
without going through netif_change_tx_queue_len(), so a device created
with "ip link add ... txqueuelen 500000" bypasses the S16_MAX cap and
still triggers the oversized ring allocations in pfifo_fast, tun and
tap. The veth peer nest (rtnl_nla_parse_ifinfomsg()) and the
RTM_NEWLINK-on-existing-device path reach the same sinks.
Enforce the cap in ifla_policy instead: IFLA_TXQLEN becomes
NLA_POLICY_FULL_RANGE(NLA_U32, &txqlen_range) with
txqlen_range = { .min = 0, .max = S16_MAX }. All netlink consumers
parse against this policy - rtnl_setlink(), rtnl_newlink() (create
and change), and the veth peer nest - so every netlink path is capped
at parse time and rejects the attribute with -ERANGE plus a proper
"integer out of range" extack message before any device state is
modified (the RTM_SETLINK half-application wart is gone with it).
Document the bound in the rt-link.yaml netlink spec.
Conditions to recreate the bug:
- CONFIG_NET_SCHED=y, CONFIG_VETH=y, CONFIG_USER_NS=y, CONFIG_NET_NS=y.
- Unprivileged user in a fresh user+net namespace (unshare -Urn):
ip link add v0 txqueuelen 500000 type veth peer name v1
-> on the fixed kernel this is rejected with -ERANGE ("integer out
of range" extack) instead of installing an oversized tx_queue_len
that later inflates pfifo_fast/tun/tap ring allocations.
- ip link set v0 txqueuelen 500000 is likewise rejected at parse time. |
| Mounting an attacker-controlled FAT image with fault tolerance enabled causes an out-of-bounds heap write during log replay. The write is attacker-positioned and attacker-valued, and on a common embedded memory layout it reaches the FX_MEDIA driver callback, giving control of the instruction pointer. |
| The Module Manager's object lookup validated one byte of a memory-protected module's search name and then walked as much of it as the module declared, in privileged mode, with the kernel's preemption count raised. Both lookup dispatchers are affected: the recommended `txm_module_object_pointer_get_extended` is handed a length and does not use it to bound the buffer, and the deprecated `txm_module_object_pointer_get` supplies the largest value a `UINT` can hold, so it removes the bound rather than lacking one.
A module can make the walk unbounded without knowing anything about the memory it reaches, and where the walk reaches memory a privileged read cannot take, the resulting fault leaves the kernel unable to preempt for the rest of the system's life.
Vulnerable functions: `_txm_module_manager_txm_module_object_pointer_get_dispatch`, `_txm_module_manager_txm_module_object_pointer_get_extended_dispatch` (both in `common_modules/module_manager/inc/txm_module_manager_dispatch.h`) and `_txm_module_manager_object_name_compare` (`common_modules/module_manager/src/txm_module_manager_util.c`). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gve: DQO: reject TSO packets with an out of range MSS
gve_prep_tso() notes that the device requires the MSS to be <= 9728,
but does not enforce it, assuming the 9K MTU enforced by the hypervisor
and the 64KB limit on TSO sizes are enough.
This does not hold for packets that were not generated locally.
A guest behind a tap, or any packet socket user, can provide an
arbitrary gso_size in virtio_net_hdr. Layer 2 forwarding does not check
the MTU for GSO packets (is_skb_forwardable()), and gso_features_check()
only bounds skb->len and gso_segs, never gso_size.
Such a packet reaches gve_tx_fill_tso_ctx_desc(), which puts gso_size
into the mss field of the TSO context descriptor. This field is 14 bits
wide, so a gso_size of 16384 is silently turned into an MSS of zero.
Drop these packets from gve_prep_tso(), and make sure that
gve_features_check_dqo() leaves their GSO bits alone: skb_segment()
splits at gso_size regardless of the MTU, so falling back to software
segmentation would give the device non TSO packets bigger than the
9728 bytes it supports.
Note that the device can still be given oversized non TSO packets when
the stack segments in software for other reasons, for instance after
TSO has been disabled with ethtool. This is a generic issue, because
the MTU check is skipped for GSO packets in the forwarding path, and
is addressed separately. |
| The X.509 parser in NetX Secure accepts an RSA public key of any size, but every signature-verification path decrypts into fixed-size buffers dimensioned for the `NX_CRYPTO_MAX_RSA_MODULUS_SIZE` default of 4096 bits. A certificate carrying a larger modulus drives an out-of-bounds write past a file-scope static during ordinary certificate-chain verification.
It is reachable pre-authentication. The issuer used for the crypto operation is looked up in the remote, peer-supplied store before the trusted store, so the attacker supplies the oversized key themselves as an intermediate in the chain they present. It triggers on a TLS or DTLS client verifying a malicious server's chain, and on a server performing client-certificate authentication. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: fbnic: Avoid rounding zero ring sizes
roundup_pow_of_two() is undefined for zero. ethtool permits a zero ring
size to reach the driver, where the minimum-size check should reject it.
Leave zero unchanged while rounding nonzero ring sizes. The minimum-size
check then rejects zero deterministically without changing the established
behavior for other values. |
| Improper validation of the Destination Connection ID length in s2n-quic 1.88.0 and earlier may allow an unauthenticated remote user to cause a denial of service by shutting down a server endpoint via a single crafted UDP datagram. Only server endpoints specifically configured to send Retry packets are affected.
To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to version v1.89.0 or later. |
| Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in WP Desk Flexible Quantity – Measurement Price Calculator for WooCommerce flexible-quantity-measurement-price-calculator-for-woocommerce allows Input Data Manipulation.This issue affects Flexible Quantity – Measurement Price Calculator for WooCommerce: from n/a through 2.3.22. |
| A flaw was found in SmallRye GraphQL. The number scalar coercion for BigInteger does not properly validate the magnitude of float or string inputs. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this by sending a GraphQL query containing a large exponent float literal. This can lead to the allocation of extremely large BigInteger objects, causing CPU exhaustion or an OutOfMemoryError, resulting in a denial of service. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: v4l2-ctrls: validate HEVC active reference counts
HEVC slice parameters are shared stateless V4L2 controls, but the common
validation path does not verify the active L0/L1 reference counts before
driver-specific code consumes them.
The original report came from Cedrus, but the active count bounds are
not Cedrus-specific. Validate them in the common HEVC slice control path
so stateless HEVC drivers get the same basic guarantees as soon as the
control is queued.
Do not reject ref_idx_l0/ref_idx_l1 entries here. Existing userspace may
use out-of-range sentinel values such as 0xff for missing references, and
some hardware can use that information for concealment. Keep this common
check limited to the active reference counts. |
| An IPv6 FlowSpec validation bypass in the CZ.NIC BIRD Internet Routing Daemon allows an established BGP peer to inject FlowSpec rules matching destinations outside the address space authorized by the unicast-route validation procedure. With validation enabled on the receiving flow6 channel, BIRD fails to reject a destination prefix component with a nonzero offset, contrary to RFC 8956 section 5. It validates a reconstructed prefix with zero-filled skipped bits, although the original FlowSpec component can match a broader set of IPv6 addresses. Given a suitable unicast route from the peer, the rule can pass validation and, where export policy permits, be propagated to downstream peers. Downstream enforcement may cause unauthorized traffic filtering or redirection. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Fix potential out-of-bounds access in osdmap_decode()
When decoding osd_state and osd_weight from an incoming osdmap in
osdmap_decode(), both are decoded for each osd, i.e., map->max_osd
times. The ceph_decode_need() check only accounts for
sizeof(*map->osd_weight) once. This can potentially result in an
out-of-bounds memory access if the incoming message is corrupted such
that the max_osd value exceeds the actual content of the osdmap message.
This patch fixes the issue by changing the corresponding part in the
ceph_decode_need() check to account for
map->max_osd*sizeof(*map->osd_weight). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: validate SVM ioctl nattr against buffer size
Validate nattr field against the buffer size, preventing
out-of-bounds buffer access via user-controlled attribute count.
(cherry picked from commit 5eca8bfdfa456c3304ca77523718fe24254c172f) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/raid5: validate payload size before accessing journal metadata
r5c_recovery_analyze_meta_block() and
r5l_recovery_verify_data_checksum_for_mb() iterate over payloads in a
journal metadata block using on-disk payload size fields without
validating them against the remaining space in the metadata block.
A corrupted journal contains payload sizes extending beyond the PAGE_SIZE
boundary can cause out-of-bounds reads when accessing payload fields or
computing offsets.
Add bounds validation for each payload type to ensure the full payload
fits within meta_size before processing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: define and enforce CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN
When decoding the key, verify that the key material would fit into
a fixed-size buffer in process_auth_done() and generally has a sane
length.
The new CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN check replaces the existing check for a key
with no key material which is a) not universal since CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE
has to be excluded and b) doesn't provide much value since a smaller
than needed key is just as invalid as no key -- this has to be handled
elsewhere anyway. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: ioam: fix heap buffer overflow in __ioam6_fill_trace_data()
On the receive path, __ioam6_fill_trace_data() uses trace->nodelen
to decide how much data to write for each node. It trusts this field
as-is from the incoming packet, with no consistency check against
trace->type (the 24-bit field that tells which data items are
present). A crafted packet can set nodelen=0 while setting type bits
0-21, causing the function to write ~100 bytes past the allocated
region (into skb_shared_info), which corrupts adjacent heap memory
and leads to a kernel panic.
Add a shared helper ioam6_trace_compute_nodelen() in ioam6.c to
derive the expected nodelen from the type field, and use it:
- in ioam6_iptunnel.c (send path, existing validation) to replace
the open-coded computation;
- in exthdrs.c (receive path, ipv6_hop_ioam) to drop packets whose
nodelen is inconsistent with the type field, before any data is
written.
Per RFC 9197, bits 12-21 are each short (4-octet) fields, so they
are included in IOAM6_MASK_SHORT_FIELDS (changed from 0xff100000 to
0xff1ffc00). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix missing key size check for L2CAP_LE_CONN_REQ
This adds a check for encryption key size upon receiving
L2CAP_LE_CONN_REQ which is required by L2CAP/LE/CFC/BV-15-C which
expects L2CAP_CR_LE_BAD_KEY_SIZE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
openvswitch: validate MPLS set/set_masked payload length
validate_set() accepted OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS as variable-sized payload for
SET/SET_MASKED actions. In action handling, OVS expects fixed-size
MPLS key data (struct ovs_key_mpls).
Use the already normalized key_len (masked case included) and reject
non-matching MPLS action key sizes.
Reject invalid MPLS action payload lengths early. |
