| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A flaw was found in FreeIPA. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending oversized form POST requests to the `/ipa/migration/migration.py` endpoint. This can force the migration handler to read attacker-controlled request bodies fully into memory, leading to increased memory usage, slower request handling, and potential service disruption or denial of service. |
| Part-DB is an open source inventory management system for electronic components. Prior to version 2.13.2, Part-DB allows authenticated API users to bypass the configured maximum attachment file size by uploading attachments through the API using base64-encoded file data. The application enforces the configured attachment size limit for normal browser-based file uploads, but the API base64 upload path does not apply the same size validation. As a result, an authenticated user with API access and permission to create attachments can upload files larger than the configured maximum attachment size, potentially exhausting disk space and causing a denial of service. This issue has been patched in version 2.13.2. |
| Resource exhaustion in Apache bRPC (version < 1.18.0) on all platforms: multiple parsers that accept wire-controlled input bound no limit on the sizes declared by the client or on decompressed output, which attackers can use to drive disproportionate memory use and crash the process.
Root Cause:
1) The gzip/zlib/snappy decompressors enforce no output limit: -max_body_size is checked against the compressed bytes only, so a cap-compliant body (e.g. 64 MiB) can decompress to tens of GiB.
2) The AMF string readers allocate the declared length before the bytes are actually available.
3) RTMP chunk headers may re-declare a message length mid-stream; the declared length was never bounded and the partial reassembly buffer kept growing.
4) The sofa-pbrpc parser does not bound meta_size.
5) mcpack2pb trusts wire-declared item counts for Reserve() and a string value_size of 0 underflows the buffer size, aborting the process.
Affected Scenarios:
Any bRPC service accepting gzip/zlib/snappy-compressed bodies or rtmp, sofa-pbrpc, or mcpack2pb messages from untrusted clients.
How to Fix:(Choose one of the following options) 1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.
2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3476
Note:
After the fix, requests whose decompressed size, RTMP message length, or mcpack declared count exceed the new limits are rejected. Operators who legitimately need larger values can raise the corresponding flag (-max_decompressed_body_size, max_body_size). |
| WPGraphQL before 2.24.1 contains a missing rate limiting vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to flood password reset emails by aliasing the sendPasswordResetEmail mutation. Attackers can send one HTTP request with many aliases, bypassing batch_limit, to exhaust mail provider quota and repeatedly rotate reset keys, blocking legitimate password recovery. |
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to 6.21.3, pypdf can consume excessive memory while opening a crafted PDF containing cross-reference streams that declare very large entry counts. Highly compressible streams and /Prev chains can multiply the number of parsed entries across a document, while negative /Index counts can bypass the existing per-stream clamp. This issue is fixed in version 6.21.3. |
| russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. Prior to 0.65.0, the client Session::process_packet path in russh/src/client/encrypted.rs accepts repeated packets encoded with russh's private msg::EXT_INFO = 7 before authentication, while the standards-compliant EXT_INFO message number 82 does not reach the affected handler. The handle_ext_info function appends every parsed extension name to received_extensions without clearing, deduplicating, or bounding the vector. A malicious SSH server that deliberately sends private message number 7 can therefore retain an unbounded number of attacker-controlled extension names for the session lifetime, causing progressive client memory exhaustion. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0. |
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to 6.21.2, an incomplete remediation for repeated malformed cross-reference entries in GHSA-55h5-xmcq-c37v could still trigger a complete PDF stream reload during each recovery attempt even when a recovery cache was present, causing crafted cross-reference streams to produce long runtimes. This issue is fixed in version 6.21.2. |
| Algorithm::UrataniTakeda versions from 0.1.5 before 0.1.7 for Perl allow memory exhaustion via a never-cleared failure shift cache in search.
The failure shift is cached for each pair of trie state and text character in a field of the matcher object, and nothing clears it. A character not seen before at a given state adds an entry that lasts for the life of the matcher.
An attacker who can submit text with many distinct characters to a long-lived matcher can grow its memory with each search. |
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to 6.20.0, accessing a crafted PDF stream with a large number of filters or multiple filters that pass around large amounts of data can cause large memory consumption. This issue is fixed in version 6.20.0. |
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to 6.21.0, an attacker can craft a PDF containing a content stream with many small operations, causing parsing to consume large amounts of memory. This issue is fixed in version 6.21.0. |
| WPGraphQL Smart Cache before 2.3.3 contains an uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to persist unlimited query documents via the Automatic Persisted Query handler. Attackers can send distinct queries with matching SHA-256 queryId values, including batched operations, to grow the wp_posts table without bound and degrade database performance. |
| Unbounded memory accumulation in the stream message reassembly path of Apache bRPC (version < 1.18.0) on all platforms allows remote attackers to exhaust the memory of a server (denial of service) by sending an endless sequence of continuation data frames.
Root Cause:
The streaming RPC protocol bounds every single data frame by max_body_size, but a fragmented stream message accumulates continuation frames into one buffer (_pending_buf) without any limit on the accumulated size. A malicious peer that can open a stream can therefore keep sending continuation frames to make the receiver accumulate an arbitrarily large in-memory message. Since the default flow-control settings (socket_max_streams_unconsumed_bytes=0) do not throttle the sending rate, the receiver's memory grows until the process runs out of memory and crashes or becomes unavailable.
Affected Scenarios:
Services that accept streams from untrusted clients (for example using brpc::StreamAccept or brpc::StreamCreate with the built-in streaming protocol) are affected.
How to Fix:
(Choose one of the following options)
1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.
2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3489
Note:
The fix limits the accumulated payload of a fragmented stream message to max_body_size (default 64MB). When the accumulated payload exceeds the limit, the pending fragments are released and the stream is closed with error EMSGSIZE. After applying the fix, legitimate fragmented stream messages larger than max_body_size will be rejected; you can adjust the gflag max_body_size to change the limit. |
| vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models. From 0.16.0 until 0.32.0, the /v1/responses endpoint allows an authenticated caller to place an attacker-controlled template in chat_template_kwargs[chat_template] when no server template is configured. ChatParams.get_apply_chat_template_kwargs() preserves that value without enforcing trust_request_chat_template, so the request can bypass the intended trust policy and cause CPU or memory exhaustion through Jinja rendering. This issue is fixed in version 0.32.0. |
| vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models. From 0.19.0 until 0.32.0, authenticated callers can supply a request chat template when no server-side --chat-template is configured, or a malicious model repository can provide a template that is compiled and rendered by tokenizer.apply_chat_template() without a wall-clock timeout, output-size limit, or iteration bound. Rendering runs in a ThreadPoolExecutor with one worker by default, so a nonterminating render can block /v1/responses and other chat-template users after the request ends, while an output-expanding render can exhaust server memory. Harmony models are not affected because they do not use this Jinja path. This issue is fixed in version 0.32.0. |
| Twisted is an event-based framework for internet applications, supporting Python 3.6+. Prior to 26.10.0rc1, twisted.words.protocols.irc.IRC.dataReceived retains all bytes received without a line feed in its per-connection buffer and applies no maximum line length. The twisted.words.service.IRCUser server subclass inherits this behavior, and buffering occurs before PASS, NICK, or USER authentication commands. An unauthenticated connection can continuously grow the buffer until the shared server process runs out of memory and drops all users. This issue is fixed in version 26.10.0rc1. |
| toml-node is a TOML parser for Node.js and the browser. Prior to 5.0.1, toml.parse() passes unbounded hexadecimal, octal, binary, and decimal digit sequences from lib/parser.js to BigInt() before reduceInteger() in lib/compiler.js checks whether the resulting value fits the TOML 64-bit integer range. Converting a sufficiently long integer string consumes super-linear CPU time and synchronously blocks the Node.js event loop, allowing one attacker-supplied TOML document to deny service to concurrent work in the process. The later range check cannot prevent the conversion cost because it executes after BigInt(). This issue is fixed in version 5.0.1. |
| Starlet versions from 0.20 before 0.33 for Perl allow memory exhaustion via unbounded buffering when decoding chunked request bodies.
The decoder adds each read to one buffer of unconsumed input. Nothing limits the length of a chunk-size line, so a line without a CRLF grows the buffer for as long as the client keeps sending, and the read timeout restarts after every read. The data of a large chunk is also held in the buffer until the whole chunk has arrived.
A remote attacker can exhaust a worker's memory with a single request. |
| The Redis protocol implementation in Apache bRPC allowed inline command parsing to allocate and copy the full connection buffer before a complete CRLF-terminated command was available. A remote attacker with access to a Redis-protocol bRPC service could send long inline inputs without a terminating CRLF to increase memory usage and CPU copy overhead, potentially causing denial of service.
Root Cause:
The Redis inline command parser allocated memory based on the current input buffer size and copied the entire buffer before determining the current inline command boundary. The existing redis_max_allocation_size limit was applied to RESP bulk strings and arrays, but not effectively to the inline command path before allocation.
Affected Scenarios:
Use Apache bRPC server with Redis protocol enabled and reachable by untrusted clients.
How to Fix:
1. Upgrade Apache bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.
2. Apply the patch from PR https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3363 .
Note:
The fix applies redis_max_allocation_size to Redis inline command lines and scans for CRLF before allocating parser arena memory. Inline command lines exceeding this limit are rejected. |
| The RTMP AMF parser in Apache bRPC accepts AMF string lengths and array counts directly from untrusted input. A remote unauthenticated attacker who can reach a bRPC server with RTMP enabled can send a small AMF payload with an excessive declared long string length or array count, causing excessive memory allocation or resource consumption before the parser rejects the incomplete payload.
Root Cause:
The AMF long string parser resized the destination string to the declared 32-bit length before validating that the stream contained that many bytes. ECMA array and strict array parsers also accepted 32-bit element counts without a configurable upper bound.
Affected Scenarios:
Deployments that enable the bRPC RTMP server component and accept RTMP traffic from untrusted clients. Direct uses of the AMF parser on untrusted data are also affected.
How to Fix:
1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.
2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3353
Note:
The fix introduces configurable AMF parsing limits. The default maximum string size is 64 MiB and the default maximum array element count is 1,048,576. Payloads above these limits are rejected. The limits can be adjusted with amf_max_string_size and amf_max_array_size. |
| Apache Kafka's code-generated readers for flexible protocol versions read a tagged-field count declared by the sender and retain a RawTaggedField object for each unknown field. That count was bounded only by the outer request frame size (socket.request.max.bytes); it was not checked against the remaining buffer bytes or capped. Because each entry can be encoded in as little as two bytes (unknown tag 0, size 0), a modest request can declare tens of millions of tagged fields and force one object allocation per declared field. Flexible request headers (header version 2, used by flexible APIs such as ApiVersions v3) are parsed this way, so the amplification applies to the request header itself.
Impact:
The flexible request header is parsed on the network thread before authorization, request dispatch, and request-time quota accounting. A client can send a request of a few tens of megabytes whose header declares about 20 million tagged fields, forcing roughly that many RawTaggedField allocations and exhausting broker heap or inducing process-wide GC stalls, denying broker service. Because the header is parsed for pre-authentication APIs such as ApiVersions (v3), the allocation can occur before authentication; no Kafka resource ACL or quota is required.
Mitigation:
Upgrade to Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, or 4.4.0. Until then, lowering socket.request.max.bytes and restricting network access to broker listeners reduces, but does not remove, exposure.
Resolution:
From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, and 4.4.0: generated readers bounds-check the tagged-field count for flexible-versioned messages, rejecting a negative count, a count exceeding the remaining buffer bytes, or a count exceeding a fixed maximum (10,000), before any per-field allocation. |
