| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Uncontrolled recursion in MessagePack\BufferUnpacker::unpack() in rybakit/msgpack versions prior to 0.11.0 allows attackers to cause a denial of service through memory exhaustion when an application decodes deeply nested, attacker-controlled MessagePack input. |
| Axigen Mail Server before 10.5.69, 10.6.x before 10.6.40, and 10.7.x before 10.7.2 contains an unauthenticated denial of service vulnerability caused by unbounded nesting depth when parsing SOAP/XML and JSON request bodies before authentication. Attackers can send a single deeply nested request to WebMail, WebAdmin, or WebMail Proxy listeners to exhaust the stack and crash SMTP, IMAP, POP3, and web services repeatedly. |
| A deeply nested multipart MIME structure constructed via the public API causes
a stack overflow in libcurl during normal cleanup operations. An excessive
recursion depth within `curl_mime_free` leads to unbounded stack frame
allocation during structure traversal, ultimately crashing the host process. |
| A flaw was found in the Ickle query parser in Infinispan. A query containing deeply nested predicates can cause recursive parsing to exhaust the Java thread stack and throw an uncaught StackOverflowError. An authenticated user with BULK_READ permission who can submit a cache query may trigger the issue, potentially affecting availability. |
| SQLite before 3.54.0 contains a stack exhaustion vulnerability that allows attackers to bypass the SQLITE_LIMIT_EXPR_DEPTH nesting limit because common table expressions are not counted against it. Attackers can supply a WITH clause chaining tens of thousands of CTEs, via plain SQL or a view in an untrusted database file, causing unbounded selectExpander() recursion that crashes the process. |
| Uncontrolled recursion in the AMF parser in Apache bRPC < 1.18.0 allows a remote RTMP peer to crash a bRPC process by sending deeply nested AMF objects or arrays. The parser recursively processed nested AMF containers without enforcing a depth limit, which could exhaust the native stack.
Affected Scenarios:
Applications using bRPC RTMP support and parsing AMF data from an untrusted RTMP peer. This includes RTMP servers parsing client command messages, RTMP clients parsing server responses or status messages, and either side parsing inbound AMF script data such as metadata or cue points. Direct callers of ReadAMFObject or ReadAMFArray on untrusted input are also affected.
How to Fix:
1. Upgrade Apache bRPC to 1.18.0.
2. Apply the patch from PR https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3344 .
Note:
The fix introduces a configurable AMF nesting depth limit with default value 128. AMF objects or arrays deeper than amf_max_depth are rejected after applying the fix. |
| Uncontrolled recursion in the Redis reply parser in Apache bRPC < 1.18.0 allows a remote Redis server peer to crash a bRPC Redis client process by returning a deeply nested RESP array reply. The parser recursed once for each nested array level without enforcing a depth limit. The fix adds a configurable Redis reply depth limit with default value 128 and rejects replies exceeding that limit.
Affected Scenarios:
Applications using bRPC as a Redis client with ChannelOptions.protocol="redis" and receiving replies from an untrusted or faulty Redis server peer.
How to Fix:
1. Upgrade Apache bRPC to 1.18.0.
2. Apply the patch from PR https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3344 .
Note:
After applying the fix, Redis replies with array nesting deeper than redis_max_reply_depth are rejected. |
| Uncontrolled recursion in the HTTP/2 HPACK decoder in Apache bRPC before 1.18.0 allows remote attackers to cause denial of service by sending a crafted HTTP/2 header block containing many consecutive Dynamic Table Size Update entries. Each update was decoded by recursively invoking the HPACK decoder, which could exhaust the thread stack before a header field or end of input was reached.
Root Cause:
The bRPC HPACK decoder recursively decoded the next entry after processing a Dynamic Table Size Update. The decoder did not bound the recursion depth, so a long sequence of update entries could consume excessive stack space.
Affected Scenarios:
Use bRPC with the built-in HTTP/2 implementation to accept HTTP/2 traffic from an untrusted network.
How to Fix:
1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.
2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3343
Note:
The fix changes HPACK Dynamic Table Size Update decoding to use iterative parsing instead of recursive parsing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix deadlock in complain-mode change_hat
The use of change_hat when in complain mode can cause a deadlock
when the hat doesn't exist and a new learning profile is created
for the missing profile. This is because change_hat() has taken
the lock to search the hat list and creating the new learning
profile needs to take the lock to add it to the list.
From the bug report:
Originally found in 7.0.0 in LTS ubuntu 26.04 with pam_apparmor + su
in complain mode set to change hats. Then verified in newest
available vanilla kernel I've compiled to see if still present:
7.2-rc7 vanilla -> affected
checked also some other kernels:
6.18.44 vanilla -> affected
6.12.95 with debian patches -> unaffected
On systems without bug (for example 6.12.95 debian) it just prints:
aa_change_hat rc=0
On systems with bug, the executable always hangs, prints nothing and
becomes unkillable. (And once stuck this way, it will cause any
further hat changes to also cause the changing process to get stuck)
Then in syslog you can find hint about cause:
kernel: INFO: task hat:3409 blocked for more than 483 seconds.
kernel: Not tainted 7.2.0-rc7 #1
kernel: "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
kernel: task:hat state:D stack:0 pid:3409 tgid:3409 ppid:2605 task_flags:0x400000 flags:0x00080800
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: <TASK>
kernel: __schedule+0x48f/0xfe0
kernel: schedule+0x27/0xa0
kernel: schedule_preempt_disabled+0x15/0x30
kernel: __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x569/0xa10
kernel: aa_new_learning_profile+0x15f/0x210
kernel: build_change_hat+0x19f/0x3b0
kernel: change_hat.isra.0+0x5dd/0xd60
kernel: aa_change_hat+0x2f3/0x710
kernel: aa_setprocattr_changehat+0x121/0x1f0
kernel: do_setattr+0x28c/0x340
kernel: apparmor_setselfattr+0x20/0x50
kernel: security_setselfattr+0xf6/0x110
kernel: __x64_sys_lsm_set_self_attr+0x53/0x90
kernel: do_syscall_64+0xdd/0x5e0
kernel: ? __mod_memcg_lruvec_state+0xfd/0x260
kernel: ? lruvec_stat_mod_folio+0x8d/0xd0
kernel: ? __folio_mod_stat+0x2d/0x90
kernel: ? map_anon_folio_pte_nopf+0xd1/0x1f0
kernel: ? do_anonymous_page+0x184/0xa10
kernel: ? __handle_mm_fault+0x805/0x870
kernel: ? count_memcg_events+0xef/0x230
kernel: ? handle_mm_fault+0x1f0/0x2f0
kernel: ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2bb/0x7b0
kernel: ? do_syscall_64+0x94/0x5e0
kernel: ? exc_page_fault+0x75/0x160
kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7f815e134c8d
kernel: RSP: 002b:00007fff6df94ea8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001cc
kernel: RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000556d8c81d040 RCX: 00007f815e134c8d
kernel: RDX: 0000000000000046 RSI: 0000556d8c81d040 RDI: 0000000000000064
kernel: RBP: 00007fff6df94ef0 R08: 00007f815e212ac8 R09: 000000000000000c
kernel: R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000556d8c81d010
kernel: R13: 0000000000000026 R14: 0000000000000046 R15: 0000000000000064
kernel: </TASK>
kernel: INFO: task hat:3409 is blocked on a mutex likely owned by task hat:3409.
To fix the issue, lift the locking out of the core of
aa_new_learning_profile(), introduce a wrapper function that takes the
lock where needed, and have build_change_hat() call the core function
that no longer takes the lock.
In addition fix 4 other issues introduced by commit
32e92764d6f8d ("apparmor: grab ns lock and refresh when looking up changehat child profiles")
- aa_get_profile_rcu() was replaced-by: aa_get_profile without the
accompanying rcu_dereference_protected()
- an extra aa_get_label(label) was introduced at the start of
change_hat() without an accompanying aa_put_label() causing a
reference count leak.
- a reference count leak was introduced in the label_is_stale(label)
case, where the newest profile would be leaked instead of the
label passed to the function.
- a potential UAF when the lookup walks up the tree with new_ns != ns
the new label refere
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: light: ltrf216a: fix runtime PM reference leak in error path
ltrf216a_get_lux() acquires a runtime PM reference by calling
ltrf216a_set_power_state(data, true). However, if
ltrf216a_read_data() fails, the function returns immediately without
dropping the reference.
This leaves the runtime PM usage count unbalanced, preventing the device
from autosuspending after a failed read.
Fix this by releasing the runtime PM reference before returning from the
error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to avoid potential deadloop in f2fs_fsync_node_pages()
There is potential deadloop in race condition:
Thread A Thread B
- fsync
- f2fs_do_sync_file
- f2fs_fsync_node_pages
- last_fsync_dnode
- folio_get(last_folio)
- f2fs_setattr
- f2fs_truncate
- f2fs_truncate_blocks
- f2fs_do_truncate_blocks
- f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks
- truncate_dnode
- truncate_node
- invalidate_mapping_pages
- folio->mapping = NULL
- is_node_folio alwasy return false
- atomic && !marked is always true,
then goto retry |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_ct: bail out on template ct in get eval
I noticed this issue while looking at a historic syzbot report [1].
A rule like the one below is enough to trigger the bug:
table ip t {
chain pre {
type filter hook prerouting priority raw;
ct zone set 1
ct original saddr 1.2.3.4 accept
}
}
The first expression attaches a per-cpu template ct via
nft_ct_set_zone_eval() (nf_ct_tmpl_alloc -> kzalloc, tuple is all
zero, nf_ct_l3num(ct) == 0). The next expression then calls
nft_ct_get_eval() on the same skb, treats the template as a real ct
and hits the 16-byte memcpy path. With dreg at NFT_REG32_15 this
overflows past struct nft_regs on the kernel stack; with smaller
dreg values it silently clobbers adjacent registers.
Reject template ct at the eval entry and in nft_ct_get_fast_eval(),
mirroring the check nft_ct_set_eval() already has. Additionally,
bound the address copy in NFT_CT_SRC / NFT_CT_DST by priv->len
instead of by nf_ct_l3num(ct): nf_ct_get_tuple() zeroes the tuple
before pkt_to_tuple() fills in only the protocol-relevant leading
bytes, so the trailing bytes of tuple->{src,dst}.u3.all are
well-defined zero. priv->len is validated at rule load, so the
copy size is now bounded by the destination register rather than
by an untrusted field on the conntrack.
[1]: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=389cf09cb72926114fce90dc85a2c3231dcb647c |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix signededness bug in smb_direct_prepare_negotiation()
smb_direct_prepare_negotiation() casts an unsigned __u32 value
from sp->max_recv_size and req->preferred_send_size to a signed
int before computing min_t(int, ...). A maliciously provided
preferred_send_size of 0x80000000 will return as smaller than
max_recv_size, and then be used to set the maximum allowed
alowed receive size for the next message.
By sending a second message with a large value (>1420 bytes)
the attacker can then achieve a heap buffer overflow.
This fix replaces min_t(int, ...) with min_t(u32) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
afs: Fix lock recursion
afs_wake_up_async_call() can incur lock recursion. The problem is that it
is called from AF_RXRPC whilst holding the ->notify_lock, but it tries to
take a ref on the afs_call struct in order to pass it to a work queue - but
if the afs_call is already queued, we then have an extraneous ref that must
be put... calling afs_put_call() may call back down into AF_RXRPC through
rxrpc_kernel_shutdown_call(), however, which might try taking the
->notify_lock again.
This case isn't very common, however, so defer it to a workqueue. The oops
looks something like:
BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#0, krxrpcio/7001/1646
lock: 0xffff888141399b30, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: krxrpcio/7001/1646, .owner_cpu: 0
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1646 Comm: krxrpcio/7001 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-build3+ #4351
Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x47/0x70
do_raw_spin_lock+0x3c/0x90
rxrpc_kernel_shutdown_call+0x83/0xb0
afs_put_call+0xd7/0x180
rxrpc_notify_socket+0xa0/0x190
rxrpc_input_split_jumbo+0x198/0x1d0
rxrpc_input_data+0x14b/0x1e0
? rxrpc_input_call_packet+0xc2/0x1f0
rxrpc_input_call_event+0xad/0x6b0
rxrpc_input_packet_on_conn+0x1e1/0x210
rxrpc_input_packet+0x3f2/0x4d0
rxrpc_io_thread+0x243/0x410
? __pfx_rxrpc_io_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xcf/0xe0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x24/0x40
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: VMAP_STACK overflow detection thread-safe
commit 31da94c25aea ("riscv: add VMAP_STACK overflow detection") added
support for CONFIG_VMAP_STACK. If overflow is detected, CPU switches to
`shadow_stack` temporarily before switching finally to per-cpu
`overflow_stack`.
If two CPUs/harts are racing and end up in over flowing kernel stack, one
or both will end up corrupting each other state because `shadow_stack` is
not per-cpu. This patch optimizes per-cpu overflow stack switch by
directly picking per-cpu `overflow_stack` and gets rid of `shadow_stack`.
Following are the changes in this patch
- Defines an asm macro to obtain per-cpu symbols in destination
register.
- In entry.S, when overflow is detected, per-cpu overflow stack is
located using per-cpu asm macro. Computing per-cpu symbol requires
a temporary register. x31 is saved away into CSR_SCRATCH
(CSR_SCRATCH is anyways zero since we're in kernel).
Please see Links for additional relevant disccussion and alternative
solution.
Tested by `echo EXHAUST_STACK > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT`
Kernel crash log below
Insufficient stack space to handle exception!/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
Task stack: [0xff20000010a98000..0xff20000010a9c000]
Overflow stack: [0xff600001f7d98370..0xff600001f7d99370]
CPU: 1 PID: 205 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.1.0-rc2-00001-g328a1f96f7b9 #34
Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
epc : __memset+0x60/0xfc
ra : recursive_loop+0x48/0xc6 [lkdtm]
epc : ffffffff808de0e4 ra : ffffffff0163a752 sp : ff20000010a97e80
gp : ffffffff815c0330 tp : ff600000820ea280 t0 : ff20000010a97e88
t1 : 000000000000002e t2 : 3233206874706564 s0 : ff20000010a982b0
s1 : 0000000000000012 a0 : ff20000010a97e88 a1 : 0000000000000000
a2 : 0000000000000400 a3 : ff20000010a98288 a4 : 0000000000000000
a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : fffffffffffe43f0 a7 : 00007fffffffffff
s2 : ff20000010a97e88 s3 : ffffffff01644680 s4 : ff20000010a9be90
s5 : ff600000842ba6c0 s6 : 00aaaaaac29e42b0 s7 : 00fffffff0aa3684
s8 : 00aaaaaac2978040 s9 : 0000000000000065 s10: 00ffffff8a7cad10
s11: 00ffffff8a76a4e0 t3 : ffffffff815dbaf4 t4 : ffffffff815dbaf4
t5 : ffffffff815dbab8 t6 : ff20000010a9bb48
status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: ff20000010a97e88 cause: 000000000000000f
Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel stack overflow
CPU: 1 PID: 205 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.1.0-rc2-00001-g328a1f96f7b9 #34
Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff80006754>] dump_backtrace+0x30/0x38
[<ffffffff808de798>] show_stack+0x40/0x4c
[<ffffffff808ea2a8>] dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x5c
[<ffffffff808ea2d8>] dump_stack+0x18/0x20
[<ffffffff808dec06>] panic+0x126/0x2fe
[<ffffffff800065ea>] walk_stackframe+0x0/0xf0
[<ffffffff0163a752>] recursive_loop+0x48/0xc6 [lkdtm]
SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel stack overflow ]--- |
| SQLite before 3.54.0 contains a stack exhaustion vulnerability in countOfViewOptimization() that allows attackers to crash the host process via count(*) over a large multi-row VALUES clause. Attackers supplying SQL or a database file with a crafted view can trigger deeply nested TK_PLUS expressions whose recursive freeing in sqlite3ExprDeleteNN() exhausts the C stack, causing denial of service. |
| SQLite before 3.54.0 contains a stack exhaustion vulnerability that allows attackers to bypass the SQLITE_LIMIT_EXPR_DEPTH limit by chaining COLLATE postfix operators. Attackers can supply roughly 175,000 chained COLLATE operators in SQL or an untrusted database view to trigger unbounded recursion in sqlite3WalkExprNN() and crash the process. |
| A flaw was found in libmodulemd. When parsing module metadata, the xmd field is converted into nested GVariant values through recursive YAML mapping and sequence helpers without a recursion-depth or node-count limit. An attacker who can supply crafted modulemd YAML with deeply nested xmd content can cause stack exhaustion or excessive resource consumption, resulting in a denial of service. |
| Forge (also called node-forge) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.1, the affected implementation used forge.tls.createConnection(), TLS record processing, process() to process the relevant input or security decision. node-forge processed received TLS records recursively, consuming one JavaScript stack frame per record in a single input chunk. A remote peer could send thousands of small records together and exhaust the call stack, causing an uncaught exception and denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.1. |
| Forge (also called node-forge) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.1, the affected implementation used asn1.fromDer(), BIT STRING decoding, maxDepth to process the relevant input or security decision. node-forge decoded ASN.1 stored inside BIT STRING values without consistently applying the configured maxDepth limit and recursively retained copies at each nesting level. Crafted DER containing nested BIT STRINGs could cause excessive recursion, CPU use, and quadratic memory consumption during asn1.fromDer(). This issue is fixed in version 1.4.1. |
